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ABSTRACT
THE CZECH-EGYPTIAN ARMS DEAL OF 1955: A TURNING POINT IN MIDDLE
EASTERN COLD WAR HISTORY
Thomas M.S. Skaggs
November 30, 2015
This study focuses on the Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms deal of 1955 and
analyzes how it impacted Middle Eastern Cold War policy. Central to the issue is
Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser’s approach to garnering Pan-Arab Nationalist
support and his decision to approach the Soviet Bloc for weapons and economic aid.
Supporting evidence came from several repositories, including the National Archives in
College Park, Maryland, and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. In addition
to primary sources, a thorough examination of the existing scholarship was conducted. In
conclusion, the Czech-Egyptian arms deal, more than any other event, cemented Nasser's
place as champion of Pan-Arab Nationalism, while also shifting Egyptian foreign policy
towards the Soviet Bloc, thereby redefining the Cold War in the Middle East.
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INTRODUCTION

“When you step foot in the Middle East the first blast that hits you in the face is
that the word 'peace' is a dirty word,” said American magazine mogul Henry Luce during
a visit to Egypt in 1956. According to him, the problem was that Arabs blamed the West
for “forcefully thrust[ing] in their sides this utterly foreign body—Israel.”1 United States
President Dwight D. Eisenhower believed the Arab-Israeli conflict “seems to have no
limit either in intensity or in scope. Everybody in the Muslim and Jewish worlds is
affected by it.”2
Following World War II, European powers could no longer maintain overseas
colonies under the direct control they had exercised during the Nineteenth Century. The
resolution of the war left only two world powers, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) and the United States of America. Both states used their political and economic
models to gain power and influence in proxy conflicts within these former colonies.
Decolonization occurred in this Cold War context, forcing developing nations to align
themselves with the aims of either the Soviet Union or the United States.3

1

2

3

The Middle East: A Report on Facts and Passions, April 20, 1956, Box 71, Jackson, C.D., Papers,
1931-64, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter abbreviated and referred to as
DDEL), 3-4.
Letter from Ike to “Swede,” November 2, 1956, file: November 1956, Box 346, Anderson Papers,
DDEL, 4.
Ray Takeyh, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain, and Nasser's Egypt, 1953-57
(New York: Oxford, 2000), 1-4.
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As a dominant power in the Middle East, Egyptian foreign policy led the way for
other states in the region. Under the charismatic leadership of Gamal Abdul Nasser,
Egypt tried to forge a third path through this dilemma, participating in the development
of the nonaligned movement.4
During the 1950s, Egypt, under the leadership of Nasser, went through a dramatic
transformation into a regional leader independent from the historical powers of France
and Great Britain. This transformation helped the USSR enter the Middle East, where
historically they had little influence. Both Russia's shift to the Middle East and Egypt's
increase in power were a result of an arms deal orchestrated between Czechoslovakia, as
a middle-man for the USSR, and Egypt in September of 1955.5
The deal developed from Gamal Abdul Nasser's quest to be the champion of PanArab Nationalism in the context of a Cold War policy of Non-Alignment. The NonAlignment movement was a group of countries seeking to chart a third course through
Cold War policy by not allying themselves with either the West or the East. To American
policy makers, the perception of losing control over Egypt represented the failure of
American Middle Eastern Cold War policy, resulting in the Eisenhower Doctrine which
outlined direct American intervention in the Middle East.6 The Czech deal led to failed
Israeli-Egyptian peace talks, a new Soviet policy in the Middle East, regional instability,
and most importantly, was the precursor to the nationalization of the Suez Canal. This
thesis argues that the Czech-Egyptian arms deal was the seminal moment that redefined
Ibid., 1-4.
Guy Laron, “Logic Dictates That They May Attack When They Feel They Can Win: The 1955 CzechEgyptian Arms Deal, the Egyptian Army, and Israeli Intelligence," The Middle East Journal Middle
East 63.1 (2009): 70.
6
Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina, 2004), 4.
4
5
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Cold War Middle Eastern policy through the USSR's entrance into the Middle East, while
simultaneously solidifying Gamal Abdul Nasser as the leader of Arab Nationalism.
As for the deal itself, the 1955 agreement afforded Egypt an estimated 100 million
dollars worth of military hardware in return for cotton and rice.7 To put this in
perspective, the dollar amount of all war materiel sent to the entire Middle East between
1951-1956, not including the Czech deal, was around 22 million dollars. This means the
Czech deal amounted for approximately 85 percent of all foreign weapons shipped to the
Middle East.8 Although no one knows the exact transfer of arms, Egypt received about
100 T-34 tanks and IS-3 Stalin tanks built just after World War Two, 80 MIG-15 jet
fighter planes, 30 IL-28 bombers, large quantities of self-propelled guns, armored
personnel carriers, artillery equipment, several naval vessels, small arms and munitions.9

Historiography and Sources
The preponderance of evidence supports that the majority of scholarship misses
the significance of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal. Today most mentions of the Czech
deal occur within the context of a broader scholarly engagement with other topics such as
Pan-Arab Nationalism.10 Pan-Arab Nationalism, or Pan-Arabism, developed from Arab
intellectuals such as Butras Bustani, Jamal al-din al-Afghani, Rashid Rida, and was
further developed by their predecessors. It borrowed heavily from Western nationalist in
7

8

9
10

Jon D. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University, 1975), 11.
$22 Million total in arms sent to Mideast, The Washington Post and the Times Herald (1954-1959),
January 28 1956, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post, 5.
Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, 11.
Examples of this include many of the sources used for this essay, including: Arab Nationalism in the
Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair, Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism and the United Arab
Republic.
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that it emphasized Arab cultural supremacy.11 Specifically, Pan-Arabism co-opts the
Wilsonian philosophy that people who share a common language, history, and culture
constitute an independent nation which should ideally manifest as an independent state.
Adeed Dawisha's Arab Nationalism in the 20th Century provides a comprehensive
overview of Pan-Arabism. Dawisha shows how the movement progressed through time,
eventually arguing that the culmination of this nationalist movement was Nasser's
leadership of Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s.12 Albert Hourani's work, Arabic
Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1936, supports Dawisha's work with a comparable
study of Arab Nationalist intellectuals. Together they provide the historical framework to
contextualize the Middle East in the 1950s.13 Dawisha notes that the 1955 Baghdad Pact,
1956 Suez Crisis, and the formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958 were the three
most important Pan-Arab moments. This assessment misses the importance of the Czech
arms deal as being the first divergence of Egyptian policy away from Western regional
dominance, and a major success in achieving a policy of Non-Alignment and should be
noted as one of the most crucial Pan-Arab events in history, especially concerning
Nasserism's central role in shaping subsequent events.14
Other scholars, such as Jankowski, frame Arab nationalism around Nasser's
motivations and the Czech deal as a significant catalyst for regional protests and a
significant boon to Nasser's regional leadership.15 Jankowski only notes the deal for its
11

12

13

14
15

From Amman (Mallory) to Sec. Of State, October 31, file 784A.56/10-3155, Box 3767, General
Records of the Department of State 1955-1959, United States National Archives, College Park,
Maryland (hereafter abbreviated and referred to as NA).
Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton:
Princeton, 2003), 160.
Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1936 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1983), iv-vi.
Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, 160.
James P. Jankowski, Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic (Boulder: Lynne
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impact on the Baghdad Pact, a defensive alliance against the Soviet Bloc between
Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran.16
In Pan-Arabism Before Nasser, Doran argues that Nasser continued the policies
of the old regime in Egypt. Choueiri proves the same point, noting that Nasser's PanArabism began as a strictly Egyptian ideology. He notes that once the 1952
revolutionaries had secured Egypt, Nasser began thinking about Pan-Arabism and its role
outside the country. This nuanced argument adeptly identifies Nasser as the pivot point
for Egyptian policy during this time.17 Podeh's Rethinking Nasserism is a revisionist
history that uses analysis of historical events to show how Nasser charted his way from
revolutionary to champion of Arab nationalism.18
The Czech arms deal appears in another section of scholarship, that of Cold War
politics. Glassman's Arms for the Arabs looks at several arms deals and places them
within the context of regional politics. Even though the Czech deal was the first large
Soviet Bloc arms deal in the region,19 very few focus on the implications of the deal as a
singularly important event.20 The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine by Takeyh outlines
the events that created the need for the United States to rethink its Middle Eastern policy.
Although the Czech arms deal is included, it does not play a prominent role in the
16
17

18

19

20

Rienner, 2001), 79.
Ibid., 77-79.
Youssef M. Choueiri, Arab Nationalism-- a History: Nation and State in the Arab World (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 179.
Elie Podeh, and Onn Winckler, Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern
Egypt (Gainesville: University of Florida, 2004), 78.
An arms deal with Syria preceded the Czech-Egyptian exchange. This deal is discussed in some length
later in this study.
Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, South Asia, and African Affairs
(Allen) to the Secretary of State, June 25, 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957,
Near East: Jordan—Yemen, XIII, Edited by John P. Glennon, (Washington DC: United States
Government Printing Office, 1988), (hereafter cited as FRUS), 574-578, 576.
Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, 10-12.
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author's analysis. Takeyh, like others fails to recognize the importance of the deal.21
Scholarship on the Suez Crisis briefly treats the Czech arms deal such as in
Nichols' Eisenhower 1956.22 Hahn's The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 19451956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War expresses the interactions between
the three countries in the 1950s. In this section of scholarship the arms deal is a tertiary
element within the larger story. These authors miss the opportunity to analyze the arms
deal as a significant catalyst that shaped United States, British and French Cold War
policy.23
Some scholars have analyzed the Czech-Egyptian arms deal within the context of
the development of foreign policy in the United States. In large part this is due to the
recent declassification of many documents within the United States in the last two
decades. One author, Ampiah, specifically identifies the deal as a moment in which
Nasser's new policies became internationally known, but does not place the CzechEgyptian arms deal within the context of Middle Eastern politics as this study does.
Ampiah correctly notes that the deal largely derailed the United States' Middle Eastern
policy; a policy that focused on regional stability led by Egypt and Israel.24 Although not
treated at length, Egypt's nationalist policies are outlined in Egypt and Indian Nationalist
Collaboration. This study, in tandem with Ampiah's, provides a general outline for the
importance of the international Bandung Conference (a conference of leaders from Asia

21
22

23

24

Takeyh, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain, and Nasser's Egypt, 1953-57, 4.
David A. Nichols, Eisenhower 1956: The President's Year of Crisis: Suez and the Brink of War (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 35.
Peter L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the
Early Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1991), 187-195.
Kweku Ampiah, The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955: The
Reactions of the US, UK and Japan (Leeds: Global Oriental, 2007), 66.
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and Africa who met in Indonesia to discuss creating a political bloc not aligned with the
West or the USSR) and how it impacted Nasser's foreign policy.25
Within the last decade, several articles have spent significant time illustrating the
finer points of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal and its impact. Motti Golani's The
Historical Place of the Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal exemplifies the new scholarship. This
military history of the deal explains its impact on the capability of Egypt to make war.
Golani argues the Czech arms deal prevented war during the fall and winter of 1955 and
therefore acted as a stabilizing force in the region.26 Given its tight focus, this study does
not treat regional politics beyond Israel and Egypt. While perhaps war was averted—after
all, Israeli raids ceased after the arms transaction—there is significant evidence to believe
the arms deal led to the Suez Crisis.
In opposition to Golani, Laron argues that Egypt had not planned to invade Israel
outright, and that Jerusalem fully understood the weakness of the Egyptian military even
with the Soviet weapons. Laron suggests that Israel viewed the Egyptian purchase as a
political threat and prepared for war.27
Biographies of Nasser also include mention of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal.
Said's Nasser stands out among them due to his in-depth treatment of Nasser's life.
Nutting's Nasser is a first hand account of his interactions with Nasser and offers insight
into the importance of the Bandung Conference for creating the connections which made
the Czech deal a reality. Although Game of Nations by Copeland is not a biography, it is
25

26

27

Noor-Aiman Khan, Egyptian-Indian Nationalist Collaboration and the British Empire (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 7-8.
Motti Golani, "The Historical Place of the Czech- Egyptian Arms Deal, Fall 1955," Middle Eastern
Studies 31.4 (1995), 818-822.
Laron, “Logic Dictates That They May Attack When They Feel They Can Win,” 70-89.
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another first hand account which identifies some significant diplomatic events. Before the
release of many classified documents within the last fifteen years, Nutting and Copeland's
books were important pillars of Middle Eastern research in the 1950s, and are still
valuable primacy sources.28
In recent years many documents have been declassified in the United States and
elsewhere. In addition to the secondary sources treated above, this study relies heavily on
documents found at the United States National Archives and the Eisenhower Presidential
Library. These include CIA regional updates and studies pertaining to the Middle East
found in the CREST CIA research database, a finding aid at the National Archives in
College Park, Maryland.
Due to the political nature of this essay, official State Department documents were
especially important. Paramount to this research effort were the John Foster Dulles
Papers at the Eisenhower Presidential Library, and the General Records from the State
Department housed in the National Archives at College Park. Also included are a number
of published primary sources. The official records from the Foreign Relations of the
United States compendiums provide unique insight into the communications of top
diplomats in the area, and supplement the unpublished records found in the various
archives used for this study.
The Library of Alexandria in Alexandria, Egypt provided Egyptian sources to
supplement the Western material used for this thesis. Several of Nasser's speeches have
been translated and included in this study. The United States National Archives and the
28

Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations; the Amorality of Power Politics (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1970).
Anthony Nutting, Nasser (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1972).
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Eisenhower Presidential Library also contained Egyptian sources that were used in this
work. These non-Western sources support a well rounded analysis of the geopolitical
situation in the Middle East during the 1950s.

Outline
The first chapter presents the historical background for the Czech-Egyptian arms
deal. The ideological and philosophical development of Arab Nationalism, beginning in
the mid 1800s, underlines the cultural undercurrent prevalent in the Middle East during
the mid Twentieth Century. Due to the complicated nature of Nasser's rise to power, a
historical brief shows how he became a leader of the Egyptian people. The chapter
concludes by outlining Nasser's plans to leverage Nasserism, his vision of an Egyptian
led Arab Nationalism, to maintain popular support.
Events of February, 1955, posed a significant threat to Nasser's leadership. This
second chapter analyzes the impact of the signing of the Baghdad Pact on February 24th
which served as a defensive alliance against Soviet encroachment into the Middle East.
The Pact was viewed as a direct threat to Egypt's political stature in the region. Just four
days later, Israel launched Operation Black Arrow, in which Israeli soldiers attacked
Egyptian military bases in the Sinai Peninsula on February 28th. Operation Black Arrow
exposed the weakened state of the Egyptian Army and threatened Nasser's leadership.
These two events threatened Nasser's Pan-Arab leadership and his regime's internal
legitimacy.
The third chapter explores the consequences of the Bandung Conference. During
the conference, Nasser was offered a leadership position that he leveraged to make

9

connections that eventually led to the Czech-Egyptian arms deal. In this way, Nasser took
the opportunity of the Bandung Conference to fashion a new foreign and domestic policy
in which he would become one of the main leaders of the Non-Aligned movement.
The fourth chapter is the most important because it outlines the Czech-Egyptian
arms deal, including the details of the agreement, as well as Nasser's goals for the deal
and how it achieved those expectations. The deal caused a significant shift in regional
balance of power towards Egypt, and served as the USSR's entrance into the Middle East
during the Cold War. While Nasser approached the West for weapons, his decision to
obtain materiel from Czechoslovakia provided the means to achieve a policy of nonalignment by moving Egypt away from its historical connections with the West.
The fifth and final chapter details the specific ramifications for the many countries
involved, including discussion of the Suez Crisis and Aswan Dam. Geopolitically,
Russian entrance into the Middle East and the United States' Eisenhower Doctrine serve
as the two most significant consequences of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal. The chapter
concludes by discussing the other countries affected by the deal, mainly France, Great
Britain, and Israel in addition to including analysis of the regional impact.

10

CHAPTER I
ARAB NATIONALISM AND GAMAL ABDUL NASSER

This chapter begins by exploring the philosophical and ideological development
of Pan-Arab Nationalism and shows how these ideas permeated the culture in concrete
ways that affected the political dynamic within Egypt. Nasser employed the ideas
developed by Arab scholars of the mid 1800s from European nationalist ideologies to
champion Nasserism and become a regional leader.

The Development of Arab Nationalism
Egyptian anti-Western sentiment existed even before Britain's involvement. From
the mid 1800s, anti-colonialism spread in the upper class through philosophical
scholarship on Arab Nationalism.29 Some Islamic Nationalists helped spread the
foundational ideology behind Pan-Arabism, mainly the concepts of exceptionalism,
multi-state political unity, and self-determination. A parallel movement with Pan-Islamic
Nationalism, Arab Nationalism's original founders date back to he mid 1800s, and draw
intellectual lineage from Pan-Islamists. The core concept behind Pan-Arabic writings was
the idea of Arab political unity—one nation, or league, governing all Arab people,
regardless of religious affiliation.30
29
30

This term is used interchangeably throughout the essay with Arabism and Pan-Arabism.
Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, 4.

11

Although scholars Jamal al-din al-Afghani (1831-1897) and his pupil Muhamed
'Abdu (1849-1905) did not discuss Nationalism by name, they laid the foundation for
later Nationalistic thought.31 The development of Nationalism coincided with Egyptian
dissatisfaction in the Ottoman Empire and foreign, specifically Western, intervention.
Afghani and 'Abdu believed the downfall of the Middle Eastern empires was caused by
the collapse and disunity of the umma, the community of believers in Islam as idealized
in the original followers of Muhammed. Their conclusion was that if the umma could be
reformed, the Middle East would return to prominence. This reality required the political
unification of Islamic and Arab speaking powers into one entity. Due to the familiarity of
the concept of an insular community, or umma, it was not long before scholars of Islamic
jurisdiction developed these ideas into a proto-nationalist ideology. Their teachings
solidified into Islamic Nationalism which at times ran counter to Arab Nationalism, as the
umma encompasses all believers of Muhammed's teachings. Regardless, they helped
create a dialogue that espoused anti-Western, pro-Arab ideology.32
Rashid Rida (1865-1935) continued his predecessors' works by instilling within
the Nationalist dialogue a sense of exceptionalism concerning ethnicity and language.
Where Nationalism is concerned, ethnicity and language play prominently in the division
between us and them, the nation and the other, and is not unique to Pan-Arabism.33 These
Egyptian scholars were important because they developed the idea that the Arab people
and language were unique and deserved self-determination without foreign intervention,
a concept taken for granted during Nasser's time, but played heavily in his anti-Western
31
32
33

Ibid., 4.
Ibid., 19.
Ibid., 20-21.
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foreign and domestic policy.
Scholars from outside of Egypt also defined Arabism as distinct from religious
unity. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi of Syria (1849-1903) promoted Arab exceptionalism
in the context of anti-colonial sentiment. He defined the Ottoman Empire as a colonial
power distinct from the Arab people concluding that political independence of Arabs was
a necessity. He stated that the Arab people have cultural and ethnic solidarity, and
therefore potential power through their united religion and language.34
Unlike the Islamic Nationalists mentioned above, Taha Husayn (1889-1973)
epitomized intellectuals that focused on language, not religion, as being the Nationalist
unifier, as is exemplified in Arab Nationalist thought. Husayn opposed Kawakibi in that
he believed the Arabic language was not exceptional, but equal to all other languages.
Arabic was the unifier of both Christian and Muslim, “the Arabic language is not the
language of the Muslims only, but the language of all who speak it however much they
differ in faith.”35 Husayn believed in Western cultural superiority, but sought to cast off
the political domination of the Middle East by Europe. He was crucial in developing PanArabism and many believed in the idea of a secular Nationalism based around the
unifying core of language rather than religion.
Christians played a crucial role in creating Pan-Arabism, and one of the most
important was the Maronite Lebanese native, Butrus al-Bustani (1919-1983). Butrus
focused on the importance of the Arabic language. He founded a secular school that
taught Arabic classical language and literature called al-madrasa al-wataniyya. He
wanted to revive the Arab world through a revival of the Arabic language and arts. He
34
35

Ibid., 23.
Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1936, 334.
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helped revive Arabic drama, literature, and journalism and wrote an Arabic dictionary
and encyclopedia, paving the way for the scholars of the late Nineteenth Century.36
Motivating Bustani, and many of the Nationalist intellectuals was the idea that the
Arabic speaking world was once a center for science, technology, and knowledge in
general. Bustani wanted to revive the lost days, and to accomplish this goal he realized
Arabs needed to learn from Europe. He professed that the Arab world needed to borrow
the National unity of Europe to become equals and this would create a world in which all
citizens co-operated on a level of equality. Those that would accepted into the nation
were those that spoke Arabic, not exclusively those that followed the Koran.37
It was of political importance for Christians to want a secular government based
around the preeminence of the Arabic language because they were a minority in the
region, even if sizable in some places. Ibrahim al-Yaziji of Syria (1847-1906), a
Christian, believed that Arabs were their own nation, and that they were entitled to a
political entity outside the purview of the Ottoman authority. Yaziji said the Arabs were
“the most remarkable of nations.”38
Another Syrian, Sati al-Husri, was opposed to Islamic Nationalism that was
controlled by the political needs of the umma, but rather a regional nationality based
solely on the Arabic language. Husri spent a great deal of effort convincing Egyptian
scholars of Pan-Arabism. Egyptian Nationalist thought before Husri focused on the
perceived historical precedence that united both Coptic Christian, and Muslim together,
their Pharaonic past.39 Baghdad was the center of Arab Nationalist thought before Husri,
36
37
38
39

Ibid., 99-100.
Ibid., 100-101.
Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, 26-27.
Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 312-316.
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and he had to convince intellectuals and commoners alike that Egypt was the center of
the Arab world:
Nature has provided Egypt with the qualities and distinctions which
oblige her to take up the task of leadership in the awakening of Arab
nationalism. She lies in the centre of the Arab countries; she forms the
largest of those blocs into which the Arab world has been divided by
policy or circumstance; this bloc has had a fuller share of the world
civilization in modern times, and has become the main cultural centre of
the Arab countries; she is the richest of all of them, and the most
advanced in the institutions of the contemporary State, the most
accomplished in eloquence and the literary arts.40
Husri noted the importance of Arabic literature, but also political power. His
ideology is exemplified in the creation of the League of Arab States in 1945 with Egypt
as the leader – a development which changed the region's opinion of Egypt as part of the
Arab world.41 The Arab Nationalist intellectuals of the Nineteenth and early Twentieth
Century disseminated the ideologies of Pan-Arabism throughout the Arab world in a way
which Nasser could harness and champion to his political designs.
Nasser's anti-colonial ideology was presaged by Arab scholars in the mid to late
Nineteenth Century. These scholars also developed the anti-colonial and anti-West
philosophy that became a part of Middle Eastern culture. Events of the Twentieth
Century further strengthened the cultural ideology developed by the early nationalist
scholars. Egypt's history was complicated by European influence. It went from a part of
the Ottoman Empire, to a failed French colony, to a British protectorate within a century.
In 1922 Britain declared Egyptian independence, but retained control over the Suez Canal

40
41

As of 2012, Egypt has a sizable Christian minority. About 10% of all citizens belong to a form of
Christianity. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html (October 31,
2016)
Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 316.
Ibid., 316.
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and maintained a garrison in Egypt. Egyptian resentment towards the West grew as
European countries strengthened their grasp on the region following the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire.42

The Development of Nasser's Egypt
Nasser's particular form of Pan-Arabism, known as Nasserism, varied only
slightly from the original philosophy. Nasser preached neutralism, non-alignment, and
wanted Palestinian independence from Israeli control. The Egyptian leader wanted a
revival of Arab dignity and an increased role in global affairs after centuries of rule by
the Ottoman Empire and Western powers. Nasser believed Egypt should be the center of
the Pan-Arab movement.43 Egypt was politically situated for Nasserism to take hold.
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, a constitutional monarchy controlled Egypt
from 1922 to 1952. This period has been labeled by many scholars as the liberal era, in
which Egypt had a parliamentary government, focused on a free enterprise economy, a
social structure of secularism, individualism, and other fixtures of Western modernism.44
The development of Pan-Arab Nationalism within the Christian minority was a unifying
factor that spurred Egyptian politicians towards liberalism.45 Although Egypt was not
technically a colony, Great Britain had significant control over Egyptian domestic and
foreign policy. Tension between Egypt and English colonial interests – especially
England's monopoly of control of the Suez Canal – continued throughout the thirty year

42
43
44
45

Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, 43.
Peter Mansfield, "Nasser and Nasserism," International Journal 28.4 (1973): 675-676.
Jankowski, Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic, 11-12.
Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 315-16, 324.
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period.46
Within the context of colonialism, global economies required trade between vast
distances. Prior to the construction of the Suez Canal, all trade from colonies in Asia had
to either go over land or by sea around the southern Cape of Africa. Both routes were
dangerous, expensive, and long. A canal between the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea
would decrease travel time, expenses, and provide a safer route. To this end, with French
leadership and British financial support, the canal was dredged and opened in 1869 with
spectacular fanfare. In 1875 Egypt sold its shares of the Canal to the British government
to repay foreign debts. France retained the majority interest, but the Canal was especially
vital for British colonial and military success. It allowed Britain a direct passage between
their home islands and colonies, the most important of which was India. The route
through the canal was the hub of the empire through which both economic prosperity and
military resources flowed.
Repeatedly, Britain proved that retaining the Suez Canal was a strategic priority.
During World War One, Britain successfully defended the Canal from Ottoman attack.
The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 allowed Britain to maintain a defense force in the
Canal Zone. Britain's economic and military strategy directly interfered with Egyptian
national politics as London lobbied for preferential policies to maintain their empire.47
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Britain managed to claim
several oil-producing regions of the Middle East, including Iraq. Control of the Canal
meant control of the seas. In case of war, Britain's ability to project power revolved
46
47

Ibid., 11-12.
Jankowski, Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic, 12.
http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/sc.aspx?show=8 Accessed: 9/27/2015.

17

around keeping the Canal in their own hands because of their reliance on their navy and
merchant marine. Britain maintained a garrison of soldiers at the Canal until July 1956.
De-colonization – the release of colonies from European control after the expense
of World War I and especially World War II – exacerbated Egypt's desire for complete
independence from foreign intervention. Pan-Arab intellectual thought of the mid to late
Nineteenth Century evolved through the Twentieth Century. As author Noor-Aiman
Khan argues, the 1920s and 1930s gave way to anti-Western nationalist ideology. In
particular, Khan links the increasing Egyptian resistance to British interference to India's
own struggle against colonialism.48 To exemplify the growing ties between India and
Egypt, Khan looks to Muhyi al-Din Rida's Abtal al-Wataniyya (Nationalist Heroes), a
popular work in which Rida displays five prominent nationalist heroes to the Egyptian
people. The five include three Egyptians: Mustapha Kamil, Muhammad Farid, and Sa'ad
Zaghlul; and two non-Egyptians: Mustafa Kemal (Attaturk) and Mahatma Gandhi.49
Within Egypt, it was not just Muhyi al-Din Rida who believed Gandhi was an
example of anti-colonialist leadership. On May 5, 1930, Gandhi was arrested just before a
planned protest. The detention made international news. Inside Egypt it made front page
news in the Al-Ahram (affiliated with the Independent party), Al-Balagh (Wafdi), and AlSiyyasa (Liberal Constitutionalist) – newspapers of all political leanings devoted energy
in covering the story.50
The next year, 1931, Gandhi visited Egypt and expressed his anti-imperialist
opinions in support of native authenticity when it came to constructing a nation's
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government. These anti-Western, pro-Egyptian ideas spoke to the public's nationalist
sensibilities. The political relationship between India and Egypt had little to do with
religion. The Wafd Party (Nationalist Party) and India's national congress exchanged
formal invitations to each others' annual congress exemplifying the political bonds. As
Egyptian and Indian students studied in Europe, they established networks and common
ideals that defined the relationship between the two countries after World War II.51 The
bonds developed between Egypt and India during this period helped form the core of the
Non-Aligned Movement over the tumultuous early years of the 1950s.

Nasser's Rise to Power
During this period of growing anti-imperialist sentiment, an important group of
officers graduated from the Egyptian Military Academy. Young and impassioned, they
went into active service during World War II. Their experiences dealing with the
Egyptian political bureaucracy combined with what they believed to be the negligence of
their commanding officers led them to question the Egyptian political structure. Many
military officers questioned whether Egypt's alliance with Britain was beneficial for both
parties, while others openly held the opinion that a victorious Germany would be a step
towards casting off the yoke of Western colonization.52
For many Egyptians, and Arabs, the creation of the Israeli state and the resettlement of thousands of Jews from Europe to Palestine seemed like another example of
how Western powers were meddling in the affairs of the Middle East. Even still, the
Egyptian people were hesitant for direct warfare with Israel in 1948, even when Arab
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Palestinians were fighting openly against the Israelis. Nevertheless, there was initially
enough support to begin sending small amounts of military aid to Palestine. Egypt, along
with a coalition of other Arab powers sent 100,000 rifles to Palestine. The 10,000 sent by
Egypt were said to perform poorly in combat. In a secret meeting of the Senate, Egypt
decided to declare war on Israel, surprising many politicians and military officers.
Muhammad Husayn Haykal, President of the Senate remembered when he was told of the
planned invasion:
“I was sitting in my office when suddenly [Muhammad Fahmi] and
Nuqrushi Pasha [Egypt's Prime Minister] walked in and requested to talk
with me in private. When we remained alone he asked me to summon the
Senate for a secret session in which the Government would present its
decision to send the Egyptian forces into Palestine to fight the Jews, I
was completely surprised.”53
Egypt, and the Arab coalition that invaded Israel, believed victory would be swift,
or conversely, the United Nations would organize a peace. Never did they believe all
seven Arab armies would be defeated by Israel. The defeat shocked Egypt more-so than
the decision to invade. The result of the 1948 war drastically changed Egyptian opinion
in opposition of Israel, and decreased support in their political leadership.54
Sickened by the incompetency of the Egyptian high command in both World War
II and the 1948 war, Nasser organized meetings with like-minded officers forming the
Free Officers Movement in 1949. As an example of their grievances, Nasser pointed to
the inadequate weapons used to fight the war. In some cases soldiers were using 1912
Mauser rifles (a 36 year old weapon at the time), and grenades which frequently more
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dangerous to the user than the enemy.55 As an instructor at the Staff College, Nasser did
not have to look far to find willing members. The organization of the Free Officers
Movement was a reaction to Western interference in Egyptian domestic affairs and was
composed by Egyptian officers who believed the government in Cairo was unrightfully
beholden to the interests of Western foreign powers.56 Nasser's involvement in the
movement was crucial in bringing about political change in Egypt. Under Nasser's
leadership, the Free Officers Movement adhered to Arab Nationalist philosophy which
demanded self-determination for all Arabs—therefore, Britain's involvement in Egypt, as
well as the monarchy's subservience to London, was intolerable. The Arab Nationalist
ideology instilled in Nasser during his formative years in the military and during the
revolution developed the context through which the Czech deal was made possible.
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llustration 1: Field Marshal Gamal Abdel Nasser witnessed the poor
quality of Egyptian military equipment while serving in Fallujah,
Iraq, December 1, 1948. Courtesy of the Library of Alexandria
photo archives, photo taken December 1, 1948.
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Nasser's personal experiences proved that the Egyptian people deserved better
leadership, and he proposed to supply this through the lens of Arab Nationalism. In 1936,
Egypt concluded a treaty with England that mandated the maintenance of a British
garrison in the Canal Zone to maintain British control of the vital transportation corridor
and therefore their dominance of the seas. In 1941, in a bid to protect these interests, the
British Ambassador surrounded the royal palace with a detachment of English soldiers
and forced King Farouk to appoint the pro-British Nahas Pasha as Prime Minister.57 With
actions like these, Britain managed to retain short-term control over Egypt and the Suez
Canal at the cost souring relations between the British Empire and the people of Egypt.
The Free Officers Arab Nationalist ideology was a singularly Egyptian pragmatic
philosophy in so far as it placed Egypt at the center of the Arab world. Author Adeed
Dawisha aptly supports that Nationalism in Egypt was tied to the country and not all
Arabs. For example, Dawisha explains, “to be an Egyptian patriot was to resist British
presence and maintain Egyptian territorial integrity.” Although the Free Officers, or some
of their members, might have been sympathetic to the idea of a Pan-Arab Nationalist
country, their true nationalism, and certainly their loyalty, was to Egypt. Although in
1947 Michael Aflaq, founder of the Ba'ath party, noted “The Arabs form one nation. This
nation has the natural right to live in a single state. [As such] the Arab Fatherland
constitutes an indivisible political and economic unity. No Arab country can live apart
from the others,” Egyptians had a distinct national identity—therefore, there was a
uniquely Egyptian Nationalism, which, on its own was incompatible with larger PanArab ideology as formulated by Aflaq.58
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Nasser's innovation on Pan-Arabism incorporated older Egyptian Nationalism
with traditional Pan-Arabism. His brand of Egyptian Nationalism, Nasserism, combined
elements from Egypt's unique historic experience—Ottoman, Arab, Islamic, Eastern, and
Pharaonic – as well as the regional impulse towards Pan-Arabism by positing Egypt as
the natural political and cultural leader of Pan-Arabism in general. Although PanArabism and Egyptian Nationalism would play a significant role in state policy,
nationalist organizations like the Free Officers championed Nasserism, rather than solely
Pan-Arabism, to support their expansion of power.59 Nasser's regime met considerable
internal resistance to his Pan-Arab ideology in the form of Communist and religious
elements. Specifically, the Muslim Brotherhood espoused Pan-Islamic rhetoric that ran
counter to Nasser's policies. Nasser brutally put down these political movements and
banned their existence within Egypt.
Once Nasser rid Egypt of internal conflict in the form of Western Imperialism and
political dissidence, Egypt and their political leaders had more ability to look outward
and become involved in international politics—Nasserism rather than Egyptian
Nationalism or Pan-Arabism grew and was further espoused in their leadership's speeches
and actions.60 This new political philosophy became more than a catalyst for narrower
Egyptian Nationalism, and once independence was won, developed into a means to exert
leadership over the region as the leading Arab power.
Egypt's King Farouk, in a bid to appease Nationalists and maintain his power and
credibility, attempted to lead the nation into a defensive alliance with the Arab states,
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however, his proposed alliance was rejected by Great Britain, further undermining public
support for the monarchy.61
In 1952 the Free Officers movement's successful coup led to many changes in
Egyptian internal policy. Nasser understood the difficulties he faced:
We Egyptians think more or less alike and we can throw ourselves
together behind the same cause, but we resist efforts to make us work
with outsiders in an orderly way, we might get other Arab countries to
agree with us on common objectives, but for us to work together in
reaching those objectives would be nearly impossible.62
Nasser realized and accepted that Egyptian Nationalism existed as a political
force, and one incompatible with generalized regional Pan-Arabism which had the
potential to turn the Arab cultural sphere into a political bloc. In order to best leverage
both of these competing ideologies, Nasser combined the two into a new hybrid political
philosophy, Nasserism, which accepted the ideals of Pan-Arabism while using Egyptian
Nationalism to justify placing Egypt at the forefront of the movement. Although the PanArabist aims of Nasserism could be used to catapult Egypt into a position of regional
dominance, initially Nasser used Egyptian Nationalism to drive support for internal
policies.
The Free Officers' initial economic policies were socialist, and opposite that of the
free market economy favored by the monarchy. On September 9, 1952 the Agrarian
Reform Law passed, redistributing land from the wealthy to sharecroppers and the
landless population. Almost 120,000 families received a portion of the 500,000 acres that
were claimed by the government for the purpose of land reform. Land ownership itself
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was limited to 300 acres per family.63 On June 18, 1953, the monarchy was formally
abolished. The Free Officers created a new bureaucracy with Muhammad Naguib as the
Republic of Egypt's first President and Nasser as the Secretary-General.64
Doran argues that the 1952 Revolutionaries largely inherited the old regime's
foreign policy.65 The difference between the deposed government, and the Free Officers
was the extent at which Egypt pursued its own path through Cold War politics.66 The
designer of this shift in Egypt's foreign policy was Nasser; the pivot point was the CzechEgyptian arms deal.
The Free Officers' movement developed several ways to promulgate Nasserism
throughout the region. On July 4, 1953 Nasser debuted the propaganda radio program
“Voice of the Arabs” broadcast with enough power to reach the entire Arab world, and
with more clarity than the American counterpart. Nasser and the Free Officers sought to
expand Egyptian interests by championing Arab nationalism. “Voice of the Arabs”
included news broadcasts, propaganda, dramas, and music.67
During several interviews with leading ambassadors in December of 1953, Nasser
designed a foreign policy.68 He decided that his foreign policy should revolve around
countries with a shared interest. This was the first practical articulation of the idea of an
“Arab Bloc,” a regional series of alliances that could contend with other such blocs. By
July of 1954, Nasser acted on the need for increased foreign collaboration in addition to
the desire to create a Pan-Arab movement. His speech on July 23, 1954 shows his
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willingness to proceed along these lines.
“Compatriots, Egypt has started a new era of relations with the Arabs—an
era based on true and frank fraternity … The aim of the Revolutionary
Government is for the Arabs to become one nation with all of its sons
collaborating for the common welfare … the revolution also believes that
the weight of the defense of the Arab states falls first and foremost on the
Arabs and that they are worthy of undertaking it.”69
Nasser framed the success of his government around the ability to create a PanArab movement. The importance of this speech revolves around the words, “defense of
the Arab states falls first and foremost on the Arabs.”70 In this context, the legitimacy of
an Arab state hinged on its ability to provide for its own defense, and that of all Arabs.
In 1954 Nasser put Naguib under house arrest and assumed the Presidency. He
leveraged Nasserism to define future Egyptian policy taking advantage of popular antiWestern sentiment. From 1954 to 1956, the region witnessed a drastic transformation in
foreign relations, the catalyst of which was the Czech arms deal of 1955.
Having removed Naguib, Nasser eliminated other areas of dissidence. The regime
targeted the Muslim Brotherhood. Several of the Brotherhood's top leaders were
executed, while many of their supporters were imprisoned. The Egyptian Communist
Party had been illegal since the 1920s and roughly 3,000 people were kept under police
surveillance, while their organizers were frequently jailed. According to Richard
Sedlacek, former Czechoslovakian Commercial Attache in Lebanon and Syria, the
Revolution of 1952 “damaged Communism's chances in Egypt considerably.”71 As Nikita
Khruschev once said, “the problem was that “Nationalist” movements aren't always
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socialist,” and Nasser's internal policies maintained strict order over political adversaries,
especially communists.72
Nasser sought to leverage Arab Nationalism to position Egypt, and himself, as
regional leaders. First, Nasser rid himself of domestic rivals before acting on his foreign
goals. Soon afterwards, he leveraged the development of Pan-Arabism from scholarly
dialogue to political movement to support his legitimacy and Egypt's ascendancy in the
Middle East. Within a year after assuming the presidency Nasser was ready to act on his
international goals and continue espousing Nasserism abroad.
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CHAPTER II
THE FEBRUARY CRISIS

This chapter discusses the Baghdad Pact concluded on February 24th 1955 and the
Israeli Operation Black Arrow of February 28th 1955, and how they challenged Egypt
internally and externally. This crisis provided the motivation for Nasser to acquire a
significant and immediate transfer of arms to bolster his military power and resulted in
Nasser's willingness to pursue weapons deals with the Soviet Bloc.
The events of February 1955 changed the landscape of Egyptian policy—the
Baghdad Pact and Operation Black Arrow posed a substantial threat to Nasser's
leadership within Egypt and the region.73 The Baghdad Pact was a military alliance of
nations sponsored by Western powers under the leadership of Great Britain to defend
against Communist encroachment in the Middle East. Four days later, on February 28,
Israel launched Operation Black Arrow, a raid on an Egyptian military base.

The Baghdad Pact
The Bagdad Pact and the Israeli Operation Black Arrow developed Nasser's belief
that only an arms deal with the East would solve his problems. The events of February
1955 posed a difficult challenge for Nasser—within four days it seemed as if regional and
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domestic political power had shifted away from Nasser and Egypt. Within the Middle
East, Egypt was a long-standing power. In addition to a strong agricultural economy,
Egypt boasted thirty two percent of the population of all Arab states, meaning that one
out of every three Arabs were Egyptian.74 Combined with Egypt's impressive cultural and
military power, by the 1950s it was the dominant Arab state, in accord with Nasserist
political philosophy. On February 24, 1955 the balance of Arab power shifted away from
the Nile and to the Tigris.75
Iraq never had the same political power as Egypt in the region in part because the
natural resources of Iraq were not seen as strategically important as the Suez Canal in
Egypt. Nonetheless, the oil fields of Iraq were significant for fueling NATO power
vehicles. For the first time since its founding after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire,
Iraq had the ability to become an international power by leading the Baghdad Pact
alliance with the West. For the political leadership of Iraq, the Cold War meant increased
power and the potential to rival Cairo. The Czech-Egyptian arms deal reversed Iraq's
significant increase in regional power as popular support swelled for Nasser.
Iraq's regional aspirations before the coup in 1958 were to gain regional power
surpassing that of Egypt. The monarchy sought a course of allegiance to the West. In
1955 they became charter members of the Baghdad Pact and were recipients of
considerable Western military aid. By the Fall of 1955 they challenged Egypt's regional
authority. In many ways, the Pact served as a defensive network against the Soviets, but
served as an economic pact against Egypt which played into the hands of Baghdad.76 The
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Pact itself stemmed from John Foster Dulles' visits to the Middle East in May 1953, but
the United States never joined the Pact in fear of disrupting regional stability to a greater
extent.77 The Baghdad Pact placed Iraq at the center of the “Northern Tier” defense plan
and they gained a great deal of respect from the populace of the entire Middle East as
defenders against Communism. Baghdad's ambition was to continue this forward
momentum and surpass Egypt as the leading nation of the Middle East. To do so, they
were forced to rely heavily on the nations of the Baghdad Pact and of Western Europe.78
The Baghdad Pact never gained the strength Britain hoped for and marginalized the Arab
countries who joined.
The goal of the Baghdad Pact, like that of NATO, was to prevent Communist
expansion specifically into the Middle East. Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain, Pakistan, and
Iran signed the treaty. One of the benefits a Pact nation received was a large supply of
defensive equipment and money from Western Europe and the United States. The
creation of the Pact around the leadership of Iraq shifted the regional balance of power to
Baghdad. Egypt feared the political ramifications, but failed to gain enough support to
quash the new organization. One author argues that the Baghdad Pact was partially aimed
at limiting Nasser's position in the Arab world.79 For Nasser, it was a sharp blow to his
Pan-Arab aspirations and re-enforced his disdain of Western involvement in the region,
ultimately expressed in the Czech-Egyptian arms deal.80
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Operation Black Arrow
On February 28, Operation Black Arrow was initiated. Israeli army soldiers raided
an Egyptian outpost. Fifty-six Egyptian soldiers were killed, and several others were
wounded. Israel claimed the attack was legitimate because Egypt had killed two
suspected intelligence officers and supported the Palestinian Fedayeen fighters that
routinely attacked Israel. Occurring just two weeks after officially assuming office,
Nasser was humiliated.81 Israel's repeated raids into Egyptian territory pushed Nasser to
engage with the Palestinian issue.
Less than a decade after the creation of the Israeli state, and the Arab-Israeli War,
the Arab threat to the nation's existence was very real. Given that Israel commanded a
larger, more technologically advanced, and far superior military, Jerusalem maintained a
defiant and aggressive stance towards its neighbors especially in light of Pan-Arabism
and Arab Nationalist impulses leveraged against them.
The primary driving force of Israeli policy was Prime Minister David BenGurion. In 1948, Ben-Gurion was the first Israeli Prime Minister and witnessed firsthand
the aggressive policy of Egypt during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war that no doubt colored his
decisions. For several months in 1954 he served as Defense Minister under Moshe
Sharett before holding both positions as Defense Minister and Prime Minister. As head of
Israeli policy and security, Ben-Gurion developed a hostile position against the Arab
nations, especially Egypt, which figured itself as the leader of Pan-Arabism.82
Under Ben-Gurion's leadership, Israel, as Said argues, purposefully maintained a
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militaristic stance to deter outside aggressors. Israel had the military capacity to launch
raids into the Sinai, attack military targets, and then return to the safety of the border
without fearing punitive retribution in kind from Egypt.83 Israel's political dominance
over Egypt stemmed from its exceptional military and superior weaponry. More than a
powerful Egypt, Israel feared a united Arab front which aimed for Palestinian statehood
and the end of Israel. Nasser's July 23, 1954 speech made Egypt the cornerstone of this
Pan-Arab movement when he stated, “The aim of the Revolutionary Government is for
the Arabs to become one nation with all of its sons collaborating for the common
welfare.” Nasser put this coalition into military terms when he stated in the same speech,
“the defense of the Arabs falls first and foremost on the Arabs.” There can be little doubt
this comment was an allusion to the Palestinian problem within Israel.84
While an ally of Israel, the United States did not see Israel fitting into their
defensive plans for the region, believing that only Egypt could maintain peaceful regional
relations. The United States put the hopes of a Western defensive plan on peace talks
between Egypt and Israel. Ben-Gurion found support from former Western colonizers
such as Britain, and most importantly France.85 In 1954 Britain agreed to evacuate its
garrison from the Suez Canal, a problematic development for Israel since the British Suez
garrison created a buffer between Egypt and Israel. Although the garrison would not be
evacuated for many months, Israel viewed this as a threat to their defense strategy.86
In 1953 the United States report on the “Principles Underlying Special Economic
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Aid for Israel” noted two challenges for the Mediterranean nation: mass immigration and
resources. Between 1948-1951 Israel absorbed 700,000 Jewish refugees accounting for
roughly a third of its population during that time period.87 Due in part to the 1948 ArabIsraeli War and the huge population influx, Israel lacked the ability to produce and pay
for food, fuel, and industrial and agricultural raw materials. The United States was
willing to provide this aid, but were unwilling to accommodate Israel's need for military
equipment.88 United States General and Special Assistant to President Eisenhower,
Charles D. Jackson, noted after a meeting with Ben-Gurion that the Israeli Prime Minister
believed a loan to develop Israeli independence from Arab water would be more
beneficial than any number of planes. Internal matters were just as crucial as defensive
capability, although it should be noted that sufficient access to clean water is also a
question of national security.89
Israeli Ambassador to the United States Abba Eban believed Nasser would push
for Arab-Israeli peace, orient Egypt toward the Western World, and dedicate himself to
internal reform.90 Nasser entertained all of these issues, but in many cases chose a path
that did not conform to Eban's wishful thinking or Israeli regional goals. Israel and BenGurion's aggressive policy toward Egypt created the conditions in which Nasser needed
better weapons to contend with the Israeli threat to his leadership.
The events of February 1955 were a serious blow to Nasser's leadership. The
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Baghdad Pact threatened Egypt's claim as the leading state in the Middle East, and Israeli
Operation Black Arrow provided Nasser's opponents the chance to develop dissent from
within Egypt, especially since Nasser had defined his political ideology, as well as his
own regime's legitimacy, on the strength of the capacity of Egypt to defend itself. In the
context of the Israeli invasions in the Sinai, Nasser had failed at his goal. Nasser needed
to re-establish Egypt as a regional force while also re-affirming internal political power—
Nasser's answer came in the Spring.
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CHAPTER III
THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE

This chapter details the impact of the April 1955, Bandung Conference. In
Bandung, Indonesia, Nasser found his options for purchasing weapons expanded by
pursuit of Non-Aligned policies, and emerged as an international leader. The
opportunities of the Bandung Conference, combined with the fears of the February Crisis,
culminated in the purchase of Soviet weapons.

Opportunity in Indonesia
February 1955 was a major set-back for Nasser. Humiliated, threatened, and
unable to attain the means to defend its people, Egypt found an answer to its troubles at
the Bandung Conference. As one of the attendees at the Conference for Afro-Asiatic
countries, Nasser had no intention of discussing a possible arms deal at the conference.
The goals of the conference were two fold: one, to unite states against marginalization in
international politics; two, to help consolidate economic developmental goals. Notable
attendees included pro-Western/anti-Communist countries such as Iran, Iraq, Pakistan,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Lebanon, and Jordan. Key neutralist countries included
Afghanistan, Egypt, India, People's Republic of China, Syria, and Yemen.91 Although
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Nasser understood that to maintain Egypt's position as champion of Pan-Arabism he must
pursue a non-aligned policy, his country's historical ties to Europe were difficult to break.
Author Lyon argues that “simultaneous bargaining with both Cold War camps thus
became one of Nasser's favorite tactics and perhaps his most novel and influential
contribution to neutralist diplomacy.”92
Indeed, Nasser's popularity rose throughout the conference. His charismatic
personality and his ability to network helped springboard Egypt onto the international
stage.93 For example, he convinced leaders from Asia and Africa to adopt a resolution in
support of the Algerian rebels, further widening the political gulf between Egypt and
France during a moving speech.94 Nasser's performance at the Bandung Conference
affirms the theory that the idea for the Czech arms deal was created after the Israeli attack
in February. Combined with Operation Black Arrow, the Bandung Conference proved to
Nasser that there needed to be a change in armament policy, and that this change could be
effected through the neutralist policy of eliciting aid from the Soviet Bloc.95

92
93
94

95

Nasser carry those ties into his new Non-Algned policy. In Illustration 2 Nasser is seen talking with
Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru at the conference in Indonesia.
Ibid., 28.
Ibid., 39.
Guy Ziv, "Shimon Peres and the French-Israeli Alliance, 1954-9," Journal of Contemporary History
45.2 (2010), 416.
Ampiah, The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955, 39.

37

llustration 2: Nasser photographed at the Bandung
Conference surrounded by other Middle Eastern
heads of state. By the end of the conference, Nasser
had become an international leader of the NonAligned movement (from Said's Nasser, page 154).
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Anthony Nutting, British politician and diplomat, remembered his interactions
with Nasser and noted in his biography of Nasser, that the Egyptian president met with
Chinese premier Zhou Enlai and the two discussed how China's military was equipped.
Zhou mentioned that the military relied upon large arms shipments from Russia. Nasser
also met with Russian ambassador Daniel Solod who candidly mentioned a possible deal
of Russian weapons for Egyptian cotton. Solod also noted the possibility of Russianbacked industrial projects in Egypt. Nasser was intrigued by the promise of developing
his nation. Zhou assured Nasser that he would speak with Moscow.96
Zhou was not the first to suggest the idea of using the Eastern Bloc countries to
Egypt's benefit. In 1953 Nasser sent the Deputy War Minister Hasan Rajab on a tour of
Eastern Bloc countries. Rajab's objective was two-fold. First, he was to widen economic
relations with the Eastern Bloc. Second, he was to seek an alternative source for arms.
The trip did not pay dividends. In part the trip was a feint: Nasser's true hope was to
frighten the West to develop greater economic ties with Egypt in fear that if they did not,
the Soviet Union would. While the tour kept the West guessing, it ultimately failed to
increase economic relations, much less substantial arms shipments. Regardless, it took
Nasser until the Bandung Conference to make the final step in purchasing arms from the
Eastern Bloc.97

Success at Bandung
February of 1955 was the crucial moment when Nasser realized he needed a
substantial increase in weaponry to contend with Israel and maintain domestic support.
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Israeli raids weakened the public's opinion of their leader. A small shipment of arms from
the West was unlikely to shift the balance of power away from Israel or make a
substantial change in popular support—Nasser decided to look to the Soviet Bloc. The
creation of the Baghdad Pact weakened Egypt's regional power and put him at odds with
the Western powers of France, Britain, and to a lesser extent, the United States. In order
to maintain Cairo's significance in the Middle East, Nasser needed to make a substantial
statement that Egypt was still leader of the Arabs—an arms deal opposing Western
powers was the answer. Finally, the Bandung Conference showed Nasser that he could be
an international leader and most significantly, the champion of Pan-Arabism. The
conference created the necessary connections to approach the USSR and develop a
neutralist policy of non-alignment—something an arms deal with the East accomplished.
To make matters worse for the West, many, including Nasser, believed Western
powers failed to provide the powers attending the conference the dignity they deserved.
Cultural miscommunications exacerbated the issue. United States ambassador to Egypt,
Henry A. Byroade did not want to interfere with the conference, and noted Nasser would
like it if “us white folks sat this one out.” Unfortunately for the United States, the
American embassy called the conference “the darktown strutters' ball.” Nasser felt
snubbed when no Western diplomat greeted him after his triumphant arrival at the
airport.98 This series of events exemplifies how cultural differences influence
international politics. The West had un-intentionally reinforced the message of the
Bandung Conference— Asian and African countries should maintain a policy of nonalignment.
98

Copeland, The Game of Nations, 189.

40

Before the Czech deal, Nasser was seen in a positive light by many in the West. In
March of 1954, “Life Magazine” profiled Nasser as the leader of the Egyptian
Revolution. He was described as a “bouncing, smiling man...who looks like a former allAmerican fullback...He...radiates the ebullient charm of an overgrown boy [and] has a
profound instinct for leadership. He is sincere and simple in a way that hovers between
naivete and profundity.”99 “Reader's Digest” noted Nasser “may evolve into a kind of
Egyptian Ataturk,” in clear reference to the Turkish leader's ability to champion
nationalist forces.100 Nasser and Ataturk were both Nationalist secularists. Due to their
secularism, both Ataturk and Nasser found significant opponents in religious political
groups. Ataturk's sweeping secular reforms created many enemies, including the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood which helped publish propaganda against the Turkish
leader inside his own country.101 The United States saw Ataturk's and Nasser's secularism
as a refreshing change to theocratic regimes in the region and viewed it as a sign that
Egypt would follow the West's Cold War policies.
If the United States policy makers were certain Nasser was going to follow the
Cold War policies of the West, the American media echoed that sentiment. Nasser found
himself in a precarious position; well liked by many in the West, he struggled to fulfill
the dream of the Revolution even as President. Nasser's future at the helm of a Cairo-led
Arab world depended on making Egypt more militarily secure.
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The Bandung Conference cemented Nasser's viability as a leader of the NonAligned movement, and galvanized his role as champion of Pan-Arabism.102 Although
Nasser's experience at Bandung planted the seeds of Egyptian engagement with the
USSR, the Czech arms deal was its realization and proved the turning point in Egyptian
achievement of Cold War neutrality. Eisenhower's laissez faire management of the
Middle East was probably one of his worst policy failings, and Nasser was “the
stumbling block.”103
Nasser took the opportunity of the Baghdad Pact and through it positioned himself
to be one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned movement. This new foreign policy, and the
contacts he made at Bandung, allowed Nasser to develop the Czech-Egyptian arms deal.
By the Spring of 1955 Egypt had enacted its neutralist policies and was moving farther
from Washington's graces. In May 1955, Egypt recognized communist China.104 In
August, China purchased roughly 4.4 million Egyptian Pounds worth of cotton,
establishing political and economic ties between the two countries. It was clear Nasser
intended to pursue a path he deemed beneficial to the continuing independence of his
country.105 This was the first of many agreements with China. Through Nasser's personal
connection with Zhou Enlai he began talks with Russian officials and concluded an arms
deal with Czechoslovakia.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CZECH-EGYPTIAN ARMS DEAL

This chapter describes the timing and content of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal, as
well as the immediate impact it had on Egypt's capacity to make war and Nasser's
legitimacy as a national and Pan-Arab leader. The Czech-Egyptian arms deal solved the
problems raised by the February crisis. With the deal, Egypt, in terms of materiel,
surpassed the capabilities of any power in the region, bolstering Nasser as an
international figure, and solidifying his internal legitimacy.

Concluding the Deal
The events of February 1955 threatened Egypt's place as leader of Pan-Arabism
and therefore the legitimacy of Nasser's political philosophy and regime. Most
importantly, the humiliation of Operation Black Arrow forced the Egyptian president to
seek foreign armaments to defend his borders. Nasser's participation in the Bandung
Conference directly led to a policy of non-alignment by seeking Soviet arms. This
chapter outlines what Nasser hoped to achieve through the arms deal, its historical
context, and detail the negotiation process in conjunction with an analysis of what was
contained in the agreement.
Initially, Nasser wanted to make an agreement with the United States, as he
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believed they might be a fair partner.106 But the United States had a long history of
denying weapons to the area. As a member of the Tripartite Agreement, a pact between
Great Britain, France, and the United States to limit arms shipments to the Middle East,
they believed shipping military equipment to either Israel or Egypt would encourage open
warfare between Arabs and Israelis.107 The most significant aspect of the United States'
policy was to avoid an arms race and military escalation between Israel and Egypt.
According to American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, “[if] the United States
[were] to sponsor an arms race between Israel and the Arab states [it] would be a very
futile action.”108 An arms race and subsequent war would threaten regional stability and
destroy any hope of a Palestinian peace settlement. America's Middle Eastern foreign
policy hinged on using Egypt's Pan-Arab nationalism in a united effort against
Communism. In 1953 the United States denied a shipment of anti-aircraft guns to Israel,
and in 1954 they did the same with a shipment of 24 F-86 fighter jets.109
Although America did not support either side, France openly sold weapons to
Israel.110 France had a long and mired history with the Middle East. Their colonial
possessions made them few allies with the Arab nations. France was specifically kept out
of the Baghdad Pact due to its colonial wars in Algeria and Indochina. Egypt publicly
supported the Algerian rebels against France. While Nasser may have gained Arab
credibility for aiding the rebels, he united Israel and France against Egypt. One author
argues that the alliance between the two countries between 1954-1959 was the initiative
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of Shimon Peres, director of the Israeli Ministry of Defense. France received Israeli
intelligence on Nasser's aid to the Algerian rebels, while Israel received French weapons.
During the Fall of 1954, France shipped AMX-13 tanks, 75mm guns, radar equipment,
and Ouragan jet fighters which were superior to any Arab plane at the time. This deal
helped bolster Israel's already superior arms supremacy over Egypt and the other Arab
nations.111 This deal occurred just months before Operation Black Arrow. The United
States' refusal to supply considerable weapons forced Nasser to look elsewhere. Nasser's
decision to obtain Soviet weapons accomplished two goals: begin a policy of NonAlignment by pitting historical Western interests against the Soviet Bloc, and securing
the weapons needed to cement his legitimacy as Egypt's defender.
Finding a way to ensure Egypt's defense was crucial for Nasser's presidency as
well as personal safety. One United States CIA report believed Egypt to have only thirty
qualified combat ready pilots by the Fall of 1955.112 Egypt was not prepared for a war
with Israel. In a Current Intelligence Bulletin, the CIA reported Nasser's position. “Nasr
appears to feel that his relations with other members of the Revolutionary Command
Council and younger army officers are so precarious that he must score a significant
success in order to retain their support.”113 Nasser believed that by concluding a
significant weapons deal with the USSR he could shore up internal support while
securing national military parity.
Nasser noted that the Israeli raid of February 28, 1955 made him rethink how he
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purchases arms and from whom.114 By July of 1955, Egypt had technicians visiting
Prague to review equipment.115 The deal was a watershed moment in Middle Eastern
history because it impacted global and regional politics.116
In September 1955, Egypt finalized a deal with Czechoslovakia as an intermediate
broker for the USSR. The allotment of T-34 tanks and IS-3 Stalin tanks represented
armored capacities on par with any power in the region. Egypt received 80 MIG-15 jet
fighter planes and 30 IL-28 bombers, practically a complete modern air force. These
additions provided Egypt with increased capability for air superiority and support of
ground operations. When combined with self-propelled guns, armored personnel
carriers, artillery equipment, several naval vessels, and small arms and munition, Egypt's
military had the potential to eclipse that of Israel, even though the deal stipulated
continued deliveries of these arms over time.117 The deal achieved and even surpassed
Egypt's main goal, to equip its military with the weapons needed to defend its borders.118
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Illustration 3: Russian designed and built, MIG-15 fighter jets were state of the art aircraft at the time
of the Czech arms deal. Seen above is an Egyptian Air Force MIG-15 parked on a runway in 1981.
Courtesy of the National Archives, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1921 – 2008,
Combined Military Service Digital Photographic Files, 1982 – 2007.
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Impact on Egypt
Before the arms deal, Egypt, and most of the Middle East, was within the West's
sphere of influence, particularly that of Britain and France. With the conclusion of the
deal, Egypt established its dominance among the Arab powers, received significantly
more armaments, and Nasser solidified his role as leader of the Egyptian people. Nasser's
shift towards neutrality and away from the West continued throughout his Presidency.
Not only was Egypt trading with Eastern Bloc countries, but it also made a deal in
August of 1955 with China. Egypt agreed to sell 4.4 million Egyptian pounds worth of
cotton, equivalent to 12,320,000 United States dollars. Even more important, this deal
was the catalyst for a series of trade agreements between Egypt and the People's Republic
of China. Nasser's policy threatened what the Western powers hoped to achieve with the
Baghdad Pact and interrupted the West's global Cold War policy.119
Nasser's interactions with Communist states did not translate to Egypt becoming
Communist. Anti-Communist campaigns within Egypt continued and the status quo was
maintained. Nasser was anti-Communist, and his relations with the USSR and China
were purely business and did not have any impact on national policy. The CzechEgyptian arms deal served as Nasser's best way to develop a modern military and
maintain the upper-hand concerning internal affairs. It did not mean the entrance of
Communism in Egypt.120
Nasser galvanized the Egyptian people by promoting Nasserism through
concluding the Czech-Egyptian arms deal with the explicit aim of balancing the power of
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the West. The Al-Akhbar newspaper noted that US Arms to Israel would spur an arms
race, a sentiment Washington agreed with. Meanwhile, the newspaper Al-Gumhouriya
agreed with Nasser's speech, “if you supply arms to Israel, we shall seek to obtain more
arms. The millions that are attacked by Israel are entitled to lead a life of peace and
security.” Operation Black Arrow enraged many across the region who believed that
Israel posed a threat to the independence of Arab people, especially those living in
Palestine. Nasser's bold actions represented the overall popular sentiments of Pan-Arab
solidarity being expressed throughout the Middle East. It was the catalyst for Nasser's
assumption of Pan-Arab leadership and Egyptian regional ascendancy.121
The Czech-Egyptian arms deal transformed the Cold War by undermining the
Western powers' ability to keep the entire region within their sphere of influence. The
USSR became a significant player in the region and Arab nations had an alternative to
Western powers.
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CHAPTER V
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CZECH-EGYPTIAN ARMS DEAL AND ITS
IMPORTANCE

This chapter explores the role of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal as the primary
factor in redefining the Cold War in the Middle East for many states, including
internationally France, Great Britain, the U. S. S. R., and the United States. The
consequences of the agreement include the solidification of Nasser as the leader of PanArabism, the USSR's entrance into the Middle East, the Suez Crisis, and the regional role
of the United States. The Czech-Egyptian Arms deal was a defining regional event in the
Cold War.

Effect on France and Great Britain
France played a vital part in regional politics during the 1950s. France and Egypt
saw the war for Algerian independence from France in different terms, and Cairo's
support of the Algerian rebels directly pushed France to back Israel with several
significant weapons shipments, even if it meant breaking the Tripartite Agreement; it
seemed to Paris as though Egypt had chosen to side against the West. Therefore the
Czech-Egyptian arms deal precipitated French involvement in the Suez Crisis against
Egypt.
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By the 1950s, France was struggling to maintain several colonies globally and
influence in the Middle East. In 1954, Paris lost its colonies in Indochina and was
fighting a costly war in Algeria. Anti-French forces in the Algerian War were supported
by Nasser's regime. French interests were threatened by Egyptian support of Algerian
rebels and countered Nasser's policy by selling considerable shipments of weapons to
Israel.
The director of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, Shimon Peres, designed the
Franco-Israeli alliance that continued from 1954-1959. Both France and Israel opposed
the policies of Nasser and hoped to decrease his power. The Algerian War of
Independence began on November 1, 1954 between Algerian nationalist forces and
France. Meanwhile, as champion of Pan-Arab Nationalism, Nasser openly supported the
rebels in a bid to increase Egyptian standing in the region as leader of the Arab nations.
During the Bandung Conference, Nasser united leaders from Asia and Africa to support a
resolution in support of the rebels. Angered and threatened by Nasser's actions, France
agreed to sell weapons to Israel as long as Israel provided France with intelligence of
Nasser's involvement in Algeria.122
The Czech arms deal threatened the efforts of French policy makers because it
meant an increasingly powerful Egypt which challenged France's role in Algeria. It also
lead to popular Arab support for the Egyptian leader creating an icon for Pan-Arabists
across the region to rally behind. The Czech arms deal helped assure French intervention
during the Suez Crisis.
From a policy perspective, the Tripartite Agreement interrupted already-agreed122
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upon Egyptian arms deals with Great Britain, confounding Nasser's objective of
maintaining a force capable of defending against Israeli attack. From the civilian
perspective, the inability of the Egyptian government to procure the equipment necessary
to defend its people undermined its credibility.123 By 1951, the Egyptian people viewed
the 75,000 British soldiers stationed in the canal zone as unwelcome Western interference
in Egypt's national affairs.
The Czech-Egyptian arms deal reaffirmed Nasser's commitment to anti-Western
policies and an active role in aiding the Algerian rebels for the foreseeable future. France
was also concerned that some of the Czech weapons might find their way to the rebels.124
These were legitimate concerns. On November 1, 1954, Nasser announced his open
support of the Algerian rebels.125 Unlike the United States, France was willing to heed
Ben-Gurion's plea that, “if we don't get quality arms in time it may be too late—there
may be an explosion the consequences of which cannot be foreseen.”126
France feared increased Egyptian military power in regards to the Algerian
conflict. France believed Egypt would send weapons to North Africa to arm Algerian
rebels. The Czech arms deal confirmed France's opposition to Egypt. When the Suez
Canal was nationalized by Egypt, France pounced on the chance to frustrate Nasser's
plans concluding in the Suez Crisis.127
Britain's strategic relationship with the Suez Canal necessitated overtures to retain
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friendly relations with Egypt. In the early 1950s Britain concluded an arms deal with
Egypt to help bolster their armor. Most of the items were never shipped and Nasser's
ascendency to presidency of Egypt further degraded relations. In total, Britain failed to
gain influence with Egypt and these efforts were largely counter productive.128
CIA Director Allen Dulles noted that after the Czech-Egyptian arms deal it was
“quite unrealistic to believe that this situation can be maintained in status quo for a period
of months, either three or six...furthermore, [the] British will not stand still long in getting
into this act and in other areas of operation.”129 Allen Dulles noted that events in the
region were moving at a quick pace, and that the loss of Western oil interests and military
bases in the Middle East would be disastrous.130
The Czech arms deal muddled the political relationship between Egypt and
England, ties that were already frayed. Ultimately, the deal lead to Nasser nationalizing
the Suez Canal. Secretary Eden wrote to Eisenhower, “we feel under no obligation to
come to the aid of Egypt. Apart from the feelings of public opinion here, Nasser and his
press have relieved us of any such obligation by their attitude to the Tripartite
Agreement.”131
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Regional Implications in the Middle East and Israel
The increase in Egyptian military capacity threatened Israeli military capability
and caused Jerusalem to prepare for war. Israel responded quickly. Israeli Ambassador
Abba Eban blamed the Czech deal for “utterly and irrevocably” forcing Israel to abandon
the “belief that progress could be made with the Nasser regime.”132 For Israel, the Czech
arms deal represented a threat to their military superiority, and therefore existence. With
the announcement of the transaction their military superiority vanished. Egypt would
have air-superiority, greater bombing capability, and increased mechanization on the
ground. Acknowledging the likelihood of engaging in another round of warfare with
Arab states, including Egypt, Ben-Gurion scrambled to obtain additional military
hardware to offset the Czech deal.133
For Israel, Egypt's increase in military capacity, along with the USSR's entrance
into the region potentially meant life or death. Ben-Gurion stated:
If the Soviets gain control of the region our existence will be impossible.
Our people in Russia are the only people which are not allowed to have
schools and newspapers. If they come to dominate this part of the world,
they will not allow us to continue to maintain a free regime...for apart
from our being Israelis we belong to the free world.134
Israel felt it was imperative to prepare for war in hopes of defending against the
new threat announced by the Czech-Egyptian arms agreement.
Ben-Gurion met with France in October, 1955 to discuss a potential arms
settlement. Within a year, Israel procured 72 Mystere-4A jet fighters, 120 AMX tanks, 40
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Super-Sherman tanks, artillery pieces, ammunition and spare parts. This was later
supplemented with a September deal including 100 Super-Sherman tanks, 200 armored
personnel carriers, 300 six-by-six trucks, and 20 tank transporters. Israel and France
made sure Nasser would not have the best military equipment for long.135
Although the Czech-Egyptian arms deal was a pivot point in Cold War and
regional policy, the large quantities of war materiel did not modernize the Egyptian army
to the extent that most countries believed it would. Egypt did not have the organizational
capability to effectively expand its armed forces as expected. No evidence supports that
Egypt was preparing an invasion of Israel: even with the new entrance of Soviet arms in
the country, Egypt's military was far from capable of defending the homeland, much less
an offensive operation. Newly declassified Israeli documents attest to this reality. Israel
knew how unprepared and ill-equipped Egypt's military was. Much of the equipment was
faulty or antiquated. For example, some of the MIG engines were outdated and decreased
maneuverability leading to at least one training crash and possibly up to eleven others.
But Israeli intelligence still viewed Egypt as newly armed and ready to attack, even if
they possessed poor military capabilities.136
Israel was concerned with how this material could be used to expand Egypt's
armed forces, rather than quantity or even quality in absolute terms. In 1956, the Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) could field 125 medium-level Sherman tanks into the framework of
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one brigade in addition to two brigades that could be quickly mobilized. Neither of these
were true armored brigades. With the addition of the Czech deal equipment, Egypt would
soon be able to field three armored brigades based around the superior T-34 tanks, and a
battalion of Centurion tanks. Golani has argued that the potential increase in Egypt's
military created a brief peace during the Fall and Winter of 1955. While Israel's
operations in Gaza and the Sinai ceased, Jerusalem stockpiled materiel for war, including
oil reserves needed for an invasion. However, the Czech-Egyptian arms deal destroyed
the regional balance of power, provoked Israel to militarize, and emboldened Nasser's
domestic policy to nationalize the Suez Canal.137 While Israel was gearing up for war,
Nasser looked to defend his borders after the Czech deal, and even after the
Nationalization of the Suez Canal.138
Far from being outgunned, Israel had a far superior military to Egypt or any other
regional power. In an American report of Israeli military capabilities, it was noted: “Israel
has the most capable military ground force in the Middle East, excluding Greece and
Turkey, and is capable of defeating any of its immediate neighbors.” The report
continued, “Israel could conduct a successful defense against any one or combination of
its Arab neighbors.” It should also be noted that Israel spent approximately 216 million
Israeli pounds on its defense budget between 1953-1954, roughly twice the total value of
the Czech arms deal.139 Even if Egypt had the weapons capable of developing a strong
military, a report on the Egyptian military noted that Cairo only had thirty qualified
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combat ready pilots.140 Although on paper the Czech deal threatened Israeli superiority,
the ability of Egypt to harness its new military weapons into effective battle action was
unlikely.
Nasser was not looking for war in the summer of 1956. Earlier that year he sent a
letter to Washington, D.C. stating:
The people of Egypt have no desire other than to grow in the peaceful
fruition of our natural inheritance. Having so recently acquired the pure
—that is to say sovereign—possession of our lands, it could not now be
our wish to assert their enjoyment for the purpose of military conquest or
adventure.
In the same letter, Nasser also promised not to allow border conflicts to escalate
into war. If Nasser's intentions were true, the Czech-Egyptian arms deal was
misinterpreted by the Israelis as an aggressive prelude to war.141
Perhaps the most significant result of the Czech arms deal was that Israel
increased its spending on fuel for tanks, heavy vehicles, and jets. Just after the Czech
deal, the Israeli stockpiles of fuel increased from 90 days to 180 days. This was
interpreted at the time as a direct result of the Czech deal and proved that the Israeli
government was planning for war far before the nationalization of the Suez Canal.
Many Israeli policy makers wanted war with Egypt over the Czech arms deal. It
was believed in Washington that Jerusalem was strongly considering a preventive war—a
conflict that would destroy Egyptian military power before the addition of Soviet
weapons.142 While Ben-Gurion did not concede to their immediate demands, preparations
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for war were set in motion. Egypt and Israel no longer worked to maintain the status-quo
—if they had before.143 The Czech deal was met by rapid Israeli preparation for war.
The Czech deal stopped Iraq's plans of becoming the leader of the Arab states.
The Baghdad Pact failed to maintain clout in large part due to the absence of Egypt. The
Pan-Arab Nationalist reaction further weakened Iraq's international status while
strengthening Egypt's, in a victory for Nasserism. The Czech arms deal created populist
uprisings damaging the Iraqi monarchy. The Iraqi government lead by Nuri al-Said used
martial law and heavy handed police tactics to keep demonstrators off the streets. Iraq's
brief political power grab was countered by Nasser's overwhelming charisma and ability
to champion Arab Nationalism. The rise of revolutionary sentiment was pervasive among
the region and Nasser's anti-Western actions spurred organizations like the Ba'athist party
in Iraq. The Ba'athist title stems from the Arabic word Al-Ba'ath meaning renaissance or
resurrection. The Ba'athist political party characterized its policy as Pan-Arab, Arab
Nationalist, socialist, anti-Western, and secular. The rise of the Ba'athist party was, in
part, a result of Nasser's political ability to show how other nations could navigate Cold
War politics without relying upon perceived colonial powers such as the United States
and Great Britain.144
The Czech arms deal had an effect across the Middle East, and in large part
because Egypt established a new precedent for national support outside the traditional
colonial powers. The deal excited the regional bias against Israel as a touchpoint for
Nasserism. Ambassador Mallory reported King Hussein's opinion, that “Jordan is in such
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an aroused state that Western support of arms to Israel would cause extreme reaction and
it would likely be impossible for Jordan to maintain any withdrawn position.”145 CIA
records support a more substantial causal relationship between the Czech arms deal and
the Jordanian reaction:
There is universal popular Jordanian enthusiasm for flame of Arab
political liberation ignited by Nasser's arms deal with the Soviet Bloc.
Jordanians shared Arab feeling of gaining initiative. A Russian token offer
of arms for local national guard would have tremendous
effectiveness...one is always returned to the hard and overriding fact that
to have Jordanians (and presumably other Arabs) on our side requires
restraint in our relations with Israel.146
Another memorandum some months later reports, “Egypt's purchase of Czech
arms resulted in prompt and dramatic change in public opinion, hardening it against
settlement with Israel, and against the West.”147
In a response to the Baghdad Pact, Russia attempted to stem the sudden wave of
pro-Western political action through an arms deal. In April of 1954, Syria received fortyfive German Panzer IV tanks from Czechoslovakia.148 There are similarities between the
Czech-Egyptian deal and the Czech-Syrian deal. Both Middle Eastern countries received
Soviet Bloc arms despite Egypt and Syria being decidedly anti-Communist. One report
noted, “in general, Syrians are not so much pro-Communist as they are anti-West. For
them, Moscow is not the home of international Communism, but the seat of the only
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great power which supports the Arab cause.”149 The difference between the Egyptian and
Syrian deal is in the sheer quantity of weapons transferred. Whereas Syria received
antiquated German tanks, Egypt received what was tantamount to a modern air force and
army in one transaction.
Another key difference between the Syrian and Egyptian deal is simply that Egypt
was the dominant regional power. Egypt was the champion of Pan-Arabism, others
looked to Egypt, not Syria, for leadership, and when Egypt received a monumental arms
deal from an anti-Western power it had significant ramifications throughout the region.
The size of the deal and the military implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict were
difficult to ignore. Egypt was the primary actor in the Arab-Israeli issue. These factors
compounded upon Egypt's demographic dominance meant that the Syrian deal was
overshadowed by the Czech-Egyptian deal. Both Russian and United States' foreign
Middle Eastern policy revolved around maintaining the favor of Egypt.
Unrest swept the Middle East following the Czech deal. In Jordan, violent
demonstrations swept the country in December of 1955. Egypt used its political clout
gained from the Czech-Egyptian arms deal to support opposition protests in Jordan. The
Jordanian government was forced to cease pursuit of joining the Baghdad Pact. The
Czech-Egyptian arms deal had an immediate and lasting impact on the region.150
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The Failure of American Policy
The Soviet Union maintained Lenin's philosophy that socialists had a duty to lend
aid to bourgeois-democratic movements for national liberation from imperial powers.151
This policy was continued by the Soviet Union and applied in the Middle East. In the
wake of World War II, Russia struggled to gain a significant foothold in a region
historically dominated by Western colonial powers, even as newly created Arab nations
struggled to establish some form of autonomy.152
On July 28, 1951 two Russian diplomats proposed to Cairo that if Egypt stopped
official talks with Britain they could plot a new course in foreign policy through
negotiations with the USSR and reaffirm Egypt's stand of neutrality between the two
Blocs.153 Former Czechoslovakian commercial attaché in Syria and Lebanon, Richard
Sedlacek, noted that the Soviets:
Always concentrated our efforts on Egypt because Egypt is the biggest of
the Arab countries...the Egyptian newspapers are read throughout the
whole Arab world; they have the biggest circulations and they influence
much public opinion throughout the other Arab states.154
While the USSR had already made some gains in Syria, they viewed Egypt as the
doorway into the Middle East. Sedlacek noted,
In Egypt for instance, our aim for some time was to show the Nasser
government-the revolutionary government-as a pawn of the Americans.
This was not true of course, but our rumors and pamphlets were effective
in creating this impression among many segments of the population.
Russia's aspirations for some kind of Middle Eastern foothold hinged on their relations
151
152
153

154

Behbehani, The Soviet Union and Arab Nationalism, 1917-1966, 5-6.
Ibid., 124
Foreign Service Dispatch 325 from Cairo: Report of Russian Overture to Egypt, July 28, 1951, File:
661.741/8-1051, Department of State, Decimal Files, NA.
October 20, 1955 Communism in Egypt, Folder: OCB 091 Egypt (Sept. 1954-Feb. 1957), Box 28, OCB
Central File Series, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 194-61, NA, 3.

61

with Egypt.155
In terms of achieving the Cold War strategy of power through influence, the
Czech arms deal was a coup for Russia, and Nasser's popularity as an Arab Nationalist
outside Egypt only helped to reinforce Russia's aspirations in the region. Soviet Deputy
Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan noted, “earlier we had no access to the Arab countries,
but once we sold arms to Egypt, we bared our teeth to our enemies, and...now they cannot
any longer resolve the issues of the near east without us.”156 The Czech arms deal was the
beginning of a new and successful policy for the Soviet Union in the Cold War struggle.
Dulles noted in a press conference:
As we observed maneuvers, we were conscious that the Soviet Union,
elsewhere in the world, was using economic and social collaboration as a
means for jumping military as well as political barriers. Examples of this
can be found in India, Egypt, and Burma...defeat in this contest would be
as disastrous as defeat in an armaments race.157
The Czech deal was designed to aid Russian foreign policy by gaining visibility in
the Middle East as a non-Western option for regimes. It also helped to increase economic
interests between Egypt and Russia, creating a relationship where none had existed
previously.158 The Czech deal was the first of many transfers of arms to the region.
Between 1955 and 1967, Egypt alone received $100 million per year (unadjusted for
inflation) in military equipment. Indeed, recent scholarship shows that arms deals were a
vital way for Russia to project its power in the region. The Soviet Union likely spent two
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or three times as much on third world arms deals as previously thought, and Egypt was
the catalyst for Russian inroads into the Middle East.159
The Czech deal announced the entrance of Russia into the Middle East, and its
implications frightened the United States. An impassioned Macmillan stated:
We are faced by a major issue. I have not been able to understand why the
Soviets have not made this move previously. It constitutes an aggressive
entrance into a new area...we could turn to the stick...the world will not
allow the USSR to become the guardian of the Suez Canal.160
Between 1953-1958, Egypt and the USSR had a mutual agreement that separated
ideology from politics. Nasser continued his repressive internal policies towards
Communists, meanwhile the Soviets did not interfere in Egypt's affairs.161 The Czech deal
paved the way for Russian financing of additional Egyptian internal projects. Within a
month after the Czech arms deal was signed, Russia was strongly pushing for Cairo to
agree to a deal that would have the Soviets finance a hydroelectric dam on the Nile
River.162 Nasser looked to the West and the Soviet Bloc for funding, but the Western
countries were inconsistent in their willingness to give Egypt money after the CzechEgyptian arms deal. In another setback for Western countries in the Cold War, Russia
funded the dam, increasing their influence in Egypt, and the region. The USSR proved
that they could help developing countries attain modern facilities in addition to military
materiel.
After the Czech-Egyptian arms deal, America lost significant influence in the
159
160

161
162

Ibid., 448-454.
Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, September 26, 1955, 9:45 P.M., FRUS, XIV 1955-1957,
Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, 517-518.
Podeh and Winckler, Rethinking Nasserism, 237.
September 28, 1955, CREST Finding Aid, Central Intelligence Agency Document, NA 4,5.

63

region. The following section outlines Washington's actions concerning Egypt in order to
show how the Czech deal altered American policy. Author Keith Krause notes arms deals
are used by dominant powers to gain influence abroad.163
Believing Washington already had control over Egypt, and not perceiving any
threat to Egyptian-United States relations, Eisenhower's policy in the Middle East
revolved around two similar goals. The primary objective was to maintain the flow of oil
from Middle Eastern wells to Western Europe. This was a reflection of Cold War policy
at the time. The Middle East was the primary oil supplier of the United States' allies,
primarily France and Britain, and in case of all-out war with the Soviets, this industry
was a necessity for future military operations.164 The second objective was to maintain
peaceful relations between Israel and the Arab nations. Egypt being the most important,
any success in solving the Arab-Israeli problem revolved around negotiations between
Nasser and Israeli President David Ben-Gurion. In a best-case scenario, the United States
wished for the Middle East to be united against Soviet aspirations, and only regional
peace could accomplish this goal.165
The United States' Cold War policy made Egypt the lynchpin to mobilize the
Middle East for the Western nations and contain Communism. The Middle East had
never been inside the United States' sphere of influence and previous action in the region
was rare and not long-lasting. Washington left these under the designs of Britain and
France which had historical colonial ties to the area. Meanwhile, the Eisenhower regime
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understood the Soviets had very little power in the region. Therefore, the United States
viewed the largest threat in the region to be instability, specifically the Arab-Israeli
problem. As a member of the Tripartite Agreement, the United States wanted to avoid an
arms race between Israel and Egypt that potentially could lead to war. In order to avoid
conflict, Eisenhower wanted to work with Egypt, as the leader of the Arab countries, to
maintain order and peace in the region. In essence, the United States foreign policy was
to maintain the status-quo, because in the grand scheme of the Cold War, the West had
the upper-hand in the Middle East.166
The Revolution of 1952, as a nationalist movement based around anti-colonial
goals, forced Egypt to be at natural odds with Western powers. The Western powers had
no uniform policy in the region and acted primarily in national self-interest, hoping to
maintain their historic spheres of influence to the detriment of Cold War strategy.
Specifically, Arab Nationalist liberation movements against Britain hurt the United
States' goals of creating strong defensive pacts in the region.167 What Washington failed
to realize was that by 1955 Nasser was ready to make drastic policy changes to maintain
Egypt's regional political dominance as well as his own regime's political security.168
Nasser openly confirmed fear for his personal safety to the United States. His
relationships with members of the Revolutionary Command Council and younger army
officers were very precarious, and had grown much worse after February, 1955.169
Foreign Officer Salah Salim noted in 1954 the desire to create a unified Arab army with
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standardized armaments and command structure.170 Salim, who supported a drastically
more intensive anti-Western policy, became the most notable internal opponent of
Nasser. For the Egyptian President, the time had come to protect his nation, and his
personal safety. Nasser's fears exacerbated his need for weapons, “the West must meet, or
better, the Soviet offer of arms and assistance or Nasser will either be overthrown or
forced to accept the Soviet offer,” said Ambassador Byroade. Salim was given a “leave of
absence” just before the conclusion of the Czech arms deal. The United States Central
Intelligence Agency believed this response was to ensure that Nasser had complete
control over the Egyptian army.171
Washington's great hope was that Egypt's role as the champion of Arab
Nationalism might align with the West's interests—this seemed plausible as former
regimes in Cairo maintained pro-Western positions. This was a fatal underestimation of
the charismatic leadership qualities of Nasser.172
Anti-Soviet progress in the Middle East was already a reality. Egypt was known
to be strongly opposed to Communism, but most crucially the Baghdad Pact created a
formal international organization to halt its spread into the area. John Foster Dulles'
mission of May 1953 was to obtain a defensive alliance in the region, as this was
achieved by 1955 with the formation of the Bagdad Pact, it appeared the United States
could push towards bridging relations between Israel and Egypt.173
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United States policy makers found Nasser to be the key to affecting positive
change in the region. One report stated:
The dominance of Prime Minister Nasir has become increasingly clear.
Nasir's personal ascendancy has been consolidated by the elimination
from the RCC of certain members such as General Naguib and former
Minister of National Guidance and Sudan Affairs, Saleh Salem...the oldline nationalist Waft Party, the reactionary Muslim Brotherhood, and the
disunited Communists have been driven into a precarious underground
existence by the regime's effective ban on political parties.174
Ironically, Salem was an anti-Western proponent, a position that Nasser did not
necessarily hold. Salem hoped to create a powerful nation with himself as the dominant
force. He was decidedly neutral in terms of Cold War politics and made decisions based
upon intended consequences for Egypt and his own power. With all other parties formally
disbanded, the United States saw in Nasser a singular power who could be used to defend
against Communism and create regional stability, ultimately disregarding Nasser's
neutralist policies.175
The Czech-Egypt arms deal destroyed United States Cold War policy because it
led to Soviet entrance into the region. In July 1956 Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal as
a development of Nasser's new neutralist foreign policy as defined by the Czech arms
deal. This turn away from the West was interpreted – within the context of American
Cold War ideology – as a turn towards the USSR and a failure of containment policy.
United States policy makers were shocked and disappointed regarding the arms
deal. The United States' policy in the Middle East was to work with Nasser as the
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dominant figure in the region in order to “engage Egypt in internal development and try
to develop a situation in which they could make peace between Israel and Arab States.” If
this failed, a workable solution would require the unaltered flow of oil from the region to
the West, control of strategic points, transport strategy involving the Suez Canal, and the
continued existence of Israel.176
News of the Czech deal significantly altered Eisenhower and Dulles' regional
plans. The Baghdad Pact had just been created as a buffer against Soviet intrusion in the
area. In terms of Cold War strategy, the Czech arms deal was disastrous for the United
States. The strongest Arab state concluded a massive military deal with the Soviets,
creating a long lasting, and binding, connection between the two states. The Czech deal
ruined the West's Middle Eastern strategy, specifically, the Tripartite Agreement's bid to
stabilize the region by diplomacy.177
The American media responded with disgust towards Egypt and Nasser.
McAlexander argues that the media's response impacted United States policy in the
Middle East and continues to influence our perceptions today.178 Time Magazine called it
“startling” and a “bombshell.” Meanwhile, the Ataturk analogy ceased, while many began
calling Nasser a fascist. In July 1956, US News and World Report said, Nasser was a
“new dictator...out to build an empire.” In response to the deal, ninety-four congressmen
attached their names to the statement, “the Egyptian-Czech arms deal brings the front of
the Cold War to the Egyptian-Israeli frontier, and the survival of Israel is directly and
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immediately menaced.” Meanwhile, the United States media noted that a triumph by
Nasser might embolden other Arab nations, thereby potentially threatening the regional
supply of oil.179
The change in public and political perception of Nasser after the Czech arms deal
impacted the way Western policy makers dealt with Egypt in regards to funding
improvement projects such as the Aswan High Dam. The press began referring to the
Egyptian president as a dictator who was “out to build an empire.”180 Opinion of Nasser
also degraded among the nation's policy makers. Ninety-four US congressmen attached
their names to the statement,
It appears that Egypt dreams not only of becoming the dominant power
among Arab powers but of actually creating an Egyptian empire. From the
Atlantic to India. To that end Egypt and Egyptian agents foment trouble
all throughout that area among other things by inflammatory radio
broadcasts into French Morocco, and by fomenting trouble in the Sudan
they arouse the more peaceful states to a jihad or holy war.181
One Democrat senator from Tennessee, Estes Kefauver referred to the deal as a
“turning point” in the region.182 As McAlexander notes, the Czech arms deal shifted
American national perspective. Instead of seeing the Middle East in a biblical, Orientalist
view, Americans now saw the region as a place where the horrors of World War II and
the Cold War were present. These changes were part of the impact of the Czech arms
deal and muddled popular and political support of U.S. bids for the Aswan Dam.183
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The Aswan Dam provided the United States an opportunity to begin a new policy
with Egypt by contributing to the largest change in Egyptian infrastructure since the
construction of the Suez Canal.184 In December 1955, Egypt turned down an American
bid to build the Dam. Eleanor Lansing Dulles believed she understood the reason.
Nasser did not want the U.S. to build that dam. He wanted the dam
built, but he didn't particularly want us to do it, and he didn't want
to have us set out systems to work in his country, because we are
too noticing, we're too detailed, we're too supervisory, and he
didn't want that much intervention in his affairs.185
The year of 1955 changed Nasser's foreign policy. He decided he could no longer
remain close to the West, even for economic projects. The United States offered a half of
the money, with another half provided by the World Bank and Britain. Eugene R. Black,
President of the World Bank, believed Egypt was the most important country in the
region, even beyond Iran and Saudi Arabia, and that the greatest failure of John Foster
Dulles' foreign policy was the inability of America to provide for the Aswan Dam. Black
notes that Nasser's purchase of Soviet weapons drove him to accept economic assistance
from the USSR for further developments.186
Nasser did not trust Black and was concerned about losing power in Cairo. “It
appears from the terms of the letter that Mr. Black wants to replace me in this country.”187
Nasser needed the dam built, and while he considered Western funding, he realized such
a move might counteract the swell in Arab popularity he enjoyed because of the Czech
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arms deal, as well as sabotage the careful balancing act between superpowers necessary
in order to maintain a policy of Non-Alignment.
Although Israel also looked to the United States for weapons, Eisenhower sent
precious few. An American report on the future capabilities of Israel and the Arab states
noted that Israel would maintain superiority through August 28, 1956 and between then
and April of 1957, they would be essentially equal. After spring of 1957, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff noted the Arab states would increase in power.188 Even with this knowledge, the
United States rejected several Israeli offers including 10,000 bomb fuses in the summer
of 1956 as Ben-Gurion prepared for war.189 Eisenhower let his subordinates understand
his position was for the good of the American people, “I don't want anybody bringing up
the matter of votes in November in connection with the Middle Eastern problem. We will
do what we think is right, and if because of that I don't get elected, I will probably be the
happiest man around.”190 In another instance, the U.S. President was noted as saying, “I
gave strict orders to the State Department that they should inform Israel that we would
handle our affairs exactly as though we didn't have a Jew in America.”191 Eisenhower
wanted to maintain good relations with the region and knew that by giving Israel
significant supplies of arms it would upset regional balance—this was also evidenced by
their reluctance to sign the Baghdad Pact or a security guarantee with Israel.192
The United States scrambled to maintain control of the Middle East. U.S. popular
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support for Nasser's regime was almost non-existent, yet Eisenhower attempted to
ameliorate the situation by rejecting several Israeli arms shipments. After the Suez Crisis,
it became clear to the United States that European powers could not be trusted to act in
the Middle East in the favor of American interests.
In the wake of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal and the shift in the balance of power
in the region away from the West, the Alpha Plan of January 1956 was a top-secret
mission designed by Eisenhower to negotiate long-lasting peace between Egypt and
Israel before war broke out. The Czech deal affected the ability of former Secretary of
Navy Robert Anderson, the man chosen to bring Ben-Gurion and Nasser to the table, to
successfully complete the mission. One British agent noted, “Nasser had changed his
ground and said that he feared the other Arab states would conduct a political attack on
Egypt if she took the lead towards a settlement.”193 With the Czech arms deal, Nasser
dedicated himself to the Pan-Arab philosophy of anti-Western, anti-Israeli political
action, and therefore led to the failure of an Arab-Israeli settlement.194
The Alpha Plan rested almost solely on the direct interactions of three key
individuals, as negotiators and personalities: Ben-Gurion, Nasser, and Anderson.195
Anderson was chosen for his personal qualities as well as his suitability as a diplomat. In
addition to his stature as former Secretary of the Navy, Anderson was also a personal
friend of Eisenhower. He visited the Middle East twice in 1956, in both January and
March, in such secrecy that not even Anderson's secretary or business associates knew
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his whereabouts.
Secrecy was of the utmost importance because Nasser feared if news broke that he
was coming to the table with Israel, or even an American representative to discuss peace
with Israel, that he would lose what Nationalist credibility he garnered from the Czech
arms deal. Anderson's alibi was a vacation to Europe. When he returned in March he
wrote a note to an associate, “I have just returned from Europe and have not had a chance
before to answer my correspondence.” His secretary covered for him. She continued
carrying on his business as usual and mailing associates apologies that Anderson was
away from the office.196
Nasser maintained that he would have no hand in sponsoring any policy related to
Israel, and that an outside source would have to propose it to the Arab leaders. He
concluded talks with Nasser stating:
You seem to talk of the problems with Israel as if they were my problems
which I have to settle. They are, in fact, your problems and you must
settle them. My only part is to be helpful in trying to sell an agreed plan
to other Arab States. I am willing to discuss Egyptian policy and
American policy, but you will have to solve the problem of Israeli
aggressiveness.197
Coming to the table with Ben-Gurion would have sabotaged his image as
champion of the Pan-Arab movement that the Czech-Egyptian arms deal had built. As for
Ben-Gurion, Israel was already preparing for war. According to Takeyh, the Czech-
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Egyptian arms deal caused Israel to adopt an increasingly aggressive policy towards
Egypt, since in response to the deal, Israel purchased additional armaments from France,
and increased their fuel reserves in preparation for war.198 Ben-Gurion mentioned his
need for weapons to Anderson, “the danger [of war] can be averted if we receive enough
defensive arms...time is the main factor and if within four or six weeks we do not obtain a
minimum of planes and tanks it will not be in our power to take the steps that are required
for a [Arab-Israeli] settlement.”199
Both France and Israel had a vested interest in bringing Cairo back to the status
quo. The Czech deal triggered the failure of the Anderson Mission and the arms race the
United States feared, as Israel's need to respond to Egypt's actions eventually led to war
later in 1956. No amount of personal charisma or rapport could overcome these larger
political forces.
The Anderson mission was doomed before it began. In many ways, the Czech
deal was the reason for the Suez War, but the nationalization of the Suez Canal proved
the impetus for combat operations.200 Immediate Western analysis of the arms deal
concluded that increased Russian influence in Egypt threatened the Suez Canal.201
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The Suez Crisis
On July 26, 1956 Gamal Abdul Nasser gave a speech in Alexandria in which he
told Egyptian forces to seize and nationalize the Suez Canal. Later that day, Egypt
blocked Israeli shipping to the Gulf of Aqaba by closing the Straights of Tiran. Israel
immediately interpreted Nasser's actions as an act of war. Although Egypt suspended
Israeli shipping through the canal, magazine mogul Henry Luce believed Egyptian
control of the Canal might improve the image of the Canal Company. Luce noted that
“Nasser is no, repeat no Communist.”202 Luce supported Nasser, “in answer to [the]
simple question whether I am for or against Nasser the simple answer is I am for him,
repeat, for him...When you find honesty in an outstanding leader it is to be prized.”203
A French council convened and on July 29, 1956 decided Egypt's actions violated
several international agreements. In response, France planned an invasion. Britain,
always wary of losing the Canal, saw the nationalization as a direct military and
economic threat. With Israel, the three forces planned an invasion of Egypt for that fall.
Amin Hewedy argues that the Czech arms deal “was the cause of the Suez Crisis...and the
sensitive junction between war and peace in the region.”204
The Czech-Egyptian arms deal was the singular event behind: the nationalization
of the Suez Canal and ensuing crisis, further escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the
construction of the Aswan High Dam with Soviet aid, the Eisenhower Doctrine
mandating American unilateral intervention in future conflicts in the region, and the Pan202

203
204

From Henry Luce to C.D. Jackson, October 9, 1956, Box 71, C.D. Jackson Papers, 1931-1967, DDEL,
2.
From Henry Luce to C.D. Jackson, May 10, 1956, Box 71, C.D. Jackson Papers, 1931-1967, DDEL.
William Roger Louis and Roger Owen, Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1989), 162.

75

Arab national dream as embodied in the United Arab Republic. The events of 1956
exemplified the political reverberations of Soviet intervention and Nasserism.
Through Pan-Arabism, Nasser developed a way to impose Egyptian power upon
the region without military action.205 The Czech arms deal allowed Nasser to lead the way
for the realization of Arab independence, or at least the proof of its potential. Jordanian
king Husayn believed the arms deal changed the face of the Middle East.206 It was the
first major break with the West and assertion of international political autonomy, which
ultimately allowed for the bold action of nationalizing the Suez Canal. The Czech deal
impacted the way Arabs viewed Egypt.207
On October 31, 1956, Israeli paratroopers were deployed across the Sinai
Peninsula. French and British warships provided support for the allied ground forces.
Aircraft carriers and planes based in Cyprus and Malta provided bombing raids, air
superiority, and close air support. While Israel focused its attention on the Sinai and
Gaza, Britain and France prioritized the Egyptian air force and deployed soldiers in Port
Said in hopes of controlling the Suez Canal. Allied air strikes were launched against
Egyptian airfields in the delta. The Egyptian military was unable to successfully respond
and suffered several defeats. Cairo responded by scuttling several ships, including a LST
filled with rocks, effectively blocking the Suez Canal to traffic for several months.
Within days, international opinion of the war waned to the extent that the allies were
taking significant political criticism over their involvement.
Countries across the world condemned the action of the allies. Swedish
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Ambassador in London, Gunnar Hagglöf summed up international opinion: “I don't think
there is any part of the world where the sympathies for England are greater than in
Scandinavia. But Scandinavian opinion has never been more shocked by a British
Government's action.”208 Within France and Britain, anti-war protests showed policy
makers the public's reluctance for further bloodshed. The backlash in Britain was intense:
“I write to you simply to express my complete abhorrence of the policy
which the government is pursuing . . I have voted Conservative in the last
three general elections, but I feel quite sure that at the next my vote will
be for a Labour candidate.”209
The war lasted from October 29 to November 7, 1956. The ensuing peace was
supported by the United States and the USSR.210
The Suez Crisis ended with the United States and Russia brokering peace. After
little more than a week of war, Israel, France, Britain, and Egypt reached an agreement:
Cairo retained control of the Suez Canal. The Czech-Egyptian deal signified the entrance
of the USSR into the Middle East in accordance with Lenin's political philosophy of
solidarity against imperial powers, thereby foreshadowing alliances with Pan-Arab anticolonial Nationalist movements.211 British and French involvement in the Suez Crisis,
acting as imperial powers, further deteriorated their position throughout the Middle East
and North Africa.212
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The eventual withdrawal of allied forces was a coup for Nasser. Even in military
defeat he showed stalwart resilience towards the West which solidified his place as leader
of the Pan-Arab movement. For Britain and France, it was a frustrating and humiliating
defeat which hurt the political parties in power.213 Other neutral countries such as India
and Yugoslavia strongly condemned France, Britain, and Israel for their invasion of
Egypt.214 Nasser returned to his role as “the military savior” of Egypt.215
The Bandung Conference showed Nasser that the neutralist path could serve
Nasserism and Egypt. The Czech arms deal and the ensuing Suez Crisis combined with
Arab Nationalist rhetoric, made Nasser the Arab people's champion, in addition to the
President of Egypt: a true regional charismatic leader. The surge of Pan-Arab support
surrounding Nasser's policies decreased support for the Baghdad Pact. Just three years
later in 1959, Iraq withdrew from the treaty. It was there-after called the Central Treaty
Organization and included Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan.216 The Czech-Egyptian arms deal
was the singular event that changed Cold War and Middle Eastern policy and its affects
are still witnessed today.

213

214

215

216

Britain and France Announce Decision to Withdraw from Egypt, December 4, 1956, CIA Current
Intelligence Bulletin, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, CREST Finding Aid,
NA, 3.
Near East Crisis, October 31, 1956, NSC Briefing, Central Intelligence Agency, CREST Finding Aid,
NA, 2.
Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, December 4, 1956, Office of Current Intelligence, Central
Intelligence Agency, CREST Finding Aid, NA, 2.
Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, 172.

78

EPILOGUE

By 1958 Egypt combined with Syria to form the United Arab Republic. For many
Arab Nationalists it was the long awaited nation that many thought was impossible. Some
believed it could be the catalyst that might form the umma into a cohesive political
power. The Czech-Egyptian arms deal increased Egypt's military power, galvanized its
population, and raised Nasser's Pan-Arab profile – culminating in the formation of the
UAR under his, and Egypt's, leadership.217
The rise of Pan-Arabism in Syria and Egypt resulted in a union between the
Ba'athist party and Nasser and the formation of the UAR. Nasser partnered with Syria
only if they did so under his terms—he continued his role as champion of Nasserism.218
From 1958-1961 the UAR, although it suffered from many internal issues, was
considered the most powerful of Arab states and had significant influence regionally and
internationally.219 Even after the fall of the UAR in 1961, Nasser continued to hold
significant power as President of Egypt until his death in 1970.
In public opinion, by resisting Israel, Britain, and France, Nasser became more
than a spokesperson for Cold War neutralism, but also a successful defender of Egypt's
interests and the Arab people. The crisis of February 1955 was a catastrophe for Nasser,
217
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with the creation of the Baghdad Pact and Israeli attacks along Gaza and the Sinai in
Operation Black Arrow. His upward trajectory began after the Bandung Conference in
April 1955 when he rose to a position of international leadership. Nasser walked away
from the Conference with a new foreign policy of Non-Alignment by playing the
interests of the USSR against the West and the means to pursue this policy by acquiring
arms from the Soviet Bloc. The Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms deal was the first action
in his new policy.
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llustration 4: Nasser giving a speech to the Egyptian people declaring the
political merger of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic,
February 1, 1958. Courtesy of the Library of Alexandria photo archives,
photo taken February 1, 1958.
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The consequences of the Czech deal were immense, but not immediate. From a
national defense perspective, Egypt significantly increased its military capacity. Such a
large addition of modern weaponry threatened even Israel's defensive ability, but only if
Egypt was able to expand and train its military in a timely manner. The deal sparked an
increase in Israeli military spending, essentially an arms race between the two most
powerful Middle Eastern countries. Increases to Israeli fuel supplies and offensive
weaponry provide evidence that Israel may have already decided war was inevitable.
From the Czech deal, Nasser acquired a sense of security. With the British garrison
removed from the Canal Zone, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956.
The Czech deal had significant implications on the Cold War. For the first time
the Soviets had reached a large deal with a Middle Eastern nation. This led the way for
further Soviet encroachment. By prioritizing economic opportunities over ideological
policies, the USSR managed to carve out significant power in the region where before it
had none. The arms deal signified a new USSR policy of engagement with the region.
Using both military and economic aid, as witnessed in the Aswan Dam, the USSR
managed, at the very least, to penetrate a previously Western unified sphere of
influence.220
The Aswan High Dam was eventually built with the help of Russian financial and
technical support. About 34,000 people helped in the construction of the Dam, of which
25,000 were Egyptian engineers. Project costs were about one billion dollars. The Dam
stops the Nile from flooding, shifts Egypt from flood based, to perennial irrigation, and
220
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generates roughly 2,100 Megawatts of electricity for Egyptian industry and households.
The amount of electricity generated per-day is a staggering 10 billion kilowatts, and Lake
Nasser (the lake created by blocking the natural flow of the Nile River) holds enough
water to equal two years of Nile water flow: the construction of the Dam meant the
ability to fully modernize Egypt. “In antiquity we built pyramids for the dead. Now we
will build new pyramids for the living.” Without the Aswan High Dam modern Egypt
would not exist.221 The USSR's funding of the Dam exemplifies their Middle Eastern
policy of gaining influence through financing development projects—a strategy that
significantly increased their Cold War power. Today a large concrete sculpture of an
Egyptian lotus flower stands nearby as a representation of the partnership between Russia
and Egypt in the construction of the Dam.222
The American policies designed to use Egypt as the cornerstone for influencing
the region were quickly scrapped as Washington hurried to devise a new strategy after the
Czech deal. In a special message to congress on January 5, 1957, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower set forth the Eisenhower Doctrine which sought to contain Nasser's Pan-Arab
movement, including his Non-Aligned advocacy, and Soviet expansion. The United
States hoped to achieve their goals through economic and military aid, and even direct
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intervention if needed.223
Yaqub argues that the Eisenhower Doctrine was a direct result of the Suez Crisis.
As has already been noted, the Czech-Egyptian arms deal was the main catalyst behind
the Suez Crisis and therefore is the true reason behind the American implementation of
the Doctrine.224 More to the point, although Eisenhower does mention the Suez Crisis as
the reason he is developing a new foreign policy in the Middle East, his focus is entirely
on Russia's emergence in the region. Eisenhower states,
The reason for Russia's interest in the Middle East is solely that of power
politics. Considering her announced purpose of Communizing the world,
it is easy to understand her hope of dominating the Middle East.225
The Suez Crisis had no relation to Russia, it was purely an interaction between Egypt,
France, Great Britain, and Israel. Granted, Eisenhower might be referring to Russia's
requests for peace, but more than likely he is referring to the effects of the CzechEgyptian arms deal. “International Communism, of course, seeks to mask its purposes of
domination by expressions of good will and by superficially attractive offers of political,
economic and military aid.”226
These “attractive offers” refer to the Czech-Egyptian arms deal concluded just a
223
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year before. Yaqub is mistaken: the Eisenhower Doctrine is not a reaction to the Suez
Crisis, it is a response to Russian interference in the region as evidenced by the CzechEgyptian arms deal, the impact of which was the Suez Crisis. Once Eisenhower
witnessed first-hand the shift in regional power caused by the deal, he proclaimed in the
Doctrine the power for unilateral United States intervention in the Middle East.227
The U.S. invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine when, in 1958, they sent marines into
Lebanon. Lebanon, like many countries in the Middle East, suffered from the destruction
of the Ottoman Empire. Between 1937-1955, the population almost doubled, growing
from 925,000 to 1,466,000. Ruled as a French Mandate, Lebanon was given
independence on November 26, 1941.228 In 1957 the public disputed the parliamentary
elections. The issue went largely unresolved and by April 1958, it led to strikes and
disorder as Lebanon plunged further into chaos. Britain and the United States feared that
Egypt (United Arab Republic) was fomenting disorder in Lebanon. This exemplifies the
ascendancy of Egypt after the Czech-Egyptian arms deal to a regional power.229
The United States and Britain acted to maintain Western-friendly governments in
Lebanon and Jordan, and thereby the status quo. The invasion of Lebanon in 1958 was
the first test of the Eisenhower Doctrine and it was a large success for the West. Both
Jordan and Lebanon retained control of their governments.230
227

Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism.

228

Dwight D. Eisenhower: Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East, January 5,
1957,
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/education/bsa/citizenship_merit_badge/speeches_national_historic
al_importance/eisenhower_doctrine.pdf, accessed October 17, 2015.
Ritchie Ovendale, "Great Britain and the Anglo-American Invasion of Jordan and Lebanon in 1958,"
The International History Review 16.2 (1994): 285.
Ibid., 287.
Ibid., 288, 292, 303.

229
230

85

Eisenhower used the Eisenhower Doctrine to return the United States' ally Great
Britain to prominence in the Middle East after the conclusion of the Suez Crisis, and
increase confidence in the Jordanian pro-US government. Ultimately, the doctrine failed
to isolate Egypt largely because of the Pan-Arab movement, which inspired political
action in its sympathizers after the Czech deal. This meant that countries such as Jordan
and Saudi Arabia could not risk leaning completely towards the West due to Pan-Arab
popular sentiment. Nevertheless, the Lebanese Crisis of 1955 was the first instance of the
United States invoking the Eisenhower Doctrine.231
The consequences of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal are still being seen through
the lens of the Eisenhower Doctrine today. Since the Lebanese Crisis of 1958, the United
States has made many unilateral interventions in Middle Eastern countries. As this essay
is being written, the United States has soldiers in the Middle East conducting combat
missions, while aerial drones strike militant groups from North Africa to Yemen. The
United States' raid on Osama Bin Laden involved a military action in Pakistan without
notifying the Pakistani government or military.232 The Czech-Egyptian arms deal had a
lasting impact on Cold War and regional policy, solidifying Nasser as the champion of an
Egypt-led Pan-Arabism and brought the USSR into the Middle East resulting in the
Eisenhower Doctrine which established the precedent for American military intervention
in the region. This essay revises current scholarship and asserts the importance of the
Czech-Egyptian arms deal as the catalyst for Russian involvement in the Middle East,
Egypt's rise to regional prominence, and Nasser's ascendancy to Pan-Arab leadership.
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